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INTRODUCTION
When the Federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA")1 was passed forty years ago, its
proponents saw it as a way of breaking the bonds of race-based ghettos and, with
* Ashland Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Richard Ausness,
Reed Colfax, Michael Healy, Rigel Oliveri, John Relman, Florence Wagman Roisman, Sarah
Welling, and Sarah Sloan Wilson for their ideas and helpful comments on this Article.
1. Title VIm of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284,82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968).
The FHA, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000).
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them, the limits on blacks' access to equal opportunity in education, suburban
jobs, and all other aspects of the American dream.2 The goal of the FHA was not
merely to end housing discrimination based on race and national origin, but to
replace the ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced living patterns."3
The FHA's goal of integrated communities has not been achieved.
Widespread residential segregation remains the norm throughout most of the
Nation.4 As a result, commentators at every decade celebration of the FHA have
bemoaned the failure of this law to achieve its goal of changing America's race-
based residential patterns.5
2. See, e.g., Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973)
(commenting that the FHA was designed "to prohibit discrimination ... so that members of
minority races would not be condemned to remain in urban ghettos ... [and] to fulfill.. . the goal
of open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in
ghettos, of racial groups"); see also congressional hearings cited infra notes 261, 278.
3. 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). Senator Mondale was the
FHA' s principal sponsor. Id. Proponents of the FHA repeatedly argued that this law was intended
not only to expand housing opportunities for individual minorities, but also to foster residential
integration for the benefit of all Americans. See id. (statement of Sen. Mondale) (noting the
alienation of whites and blacks caused by the "lack of experience in actually living next" to each
other and that "[i]f America is to escape apartheid we must begin now, and the best way for this
Congress to start on the true road to integration is by enacting fair housing legislation"); 114 CONG.
REC. 9959 (1968) (statement of Rep. Cellar, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee) (calling
for elimination of "the blight of segregated housing patterns"); see also Florence Wagman Roisman,
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public
Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 333, 372-86 (2007) (citing other
relevant legislative history).
4. Residential segregation is commonly measured on a 100-point "dissimilarity" index, with
100 indicating total segregation (i.e., blacks and whites live separately in racially homogeneous
areas) and zero indicating a population that is randomly distributed by race. See, e.g., JOHN LOGAN,
LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., ETHNIC DIvERsrrY GRows, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND
2 (2001), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/cen2000/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.
pdf. "A value of 60 or above is considered very high." Id.
Data from the 2000 census yield a nationwide figure of sixty-four for white-black residential
segregation in major metropolitan areas, which was modestly down from sixty-eight in 1990 and
seventy-three in 1980. JOHN ICELAND & DANIELH. WEINBERG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIALAND
ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000, at 60 (2002), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing-patterns/pdf/censr-3.pdf. If this rate of
progress were to continue, "it may take forty more years for black-white segregation to come down
even to the current level of Hispanic-white segregation." LOGAN, supra, at 1. The nationwide figure
for Hispanic-white segregation remained at about fifty from 1980 through 2000. ICELAND &
WEINBERG, supra, at 78.
5. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act: Hearing on H.R. 3504 and H.R. 7787 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 2-3 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Edwards, Chairman, S. Comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (noting that "housing segregation and discrimination has [sic] become more
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One of the reasons for this disappointing story is that race and national origin
discrimination in housing remains pervasive.6 It has also become apparent,
however, that even if full compliance with the FHA were to be achieved,
residential integration would still face significant obstacles, including a growing
acceptance by African Americans that living in communities where their own
race predominates may be preferable to making pioneering moves into white
areas. As Professor Calmore wrote fifteen years ago, "blacks increasingly value
black community attachment and affiliation at the expense of integration."7
Two other introductory observations are pertinent here. First, 2008, like
1968 when the FHA was passed, is a presidential election year that seems likely
to mark a shift in national emphasis on minority rights, played out against the
background of an unpopular foreign war. Forty years ago, President Lyndon
Johnson, perhaps the greatest advocate of civil rights to occupy the White House
in the twentieth century and the original proponent of the FHA, was so weakened
by the national strife that accompanied his prosecution of the Vietnam War that
his party, so dominant four years earlier, gave way to Republican Richard Nixon.
Nixon's "Southern Strategy" won over to the Republican banner virtually all of
the old entrenched white power structure of the South and eventually most of the
reactionary forces from all parts of the country, ultimately turning the party of
Abraham Lincoln into a bastion of anti-minority sentiment. The success of this
pervasive and more intractable in the last [ten] years" since "the signing of the bill which committed
our government to the elimination of all barriers to equal opportunity in housing"); THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) (regarding the twentieth
anniversary); John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1067 (1998) (regarding the thirtieth anniversary); john a. powell, Reflections on the
Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 41 IND. L. REv. 605, 605-08 (2008)
(regarding the fortieth anniversary).
6. See, e.g., MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ETAL, DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING
MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000, at i-iv (2002) (reporting on a nationwide
testing study showing that whites were favored in rental tests over blacks 21.6% of the time and
over Hispanics 25.7% of the time and that whites were favored in sales tests over blacks 17.0% of
the time and over Hispanics 19.7% of the time).
7. John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-
Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. Rv. 1487, 1506 (1993); see also id. ("[A] growing segment of the black
middle class is voluntarily attaining housing in black areas. This may stem in part from the increase
in black alienation from white society that has developed from the late 1960s and into the early
1980s among all segments of the black community."); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF
INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM xii-xiii, 9-10
(2004) ("Black people.., have become integration weary.... IFlor some of us integration now
means a majority-black neighborhood .... African Americans are increasingly reluctant to move
into neighborhoods without a significant black presence."); Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Can We
Live Together? Racial Preferences and Neighborhood Outcomes, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 45, 59 (Xavier de Souza
Briggs ed., 2005) (reporting "a growing preference among blacks for neighborhoods that are
majority same-race, contrary to previously more distinct preferences for 50-50 neighborhoods").
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strategy helped Republicans occupy the White House for most of the next forty
years, with presidents characterized by an ever increasing hostility to the civil
rights goals of the 1960s and an ever stronger commitment to filling the federal
judiciary with anti-civil rights reactionaries. This political era may be coming
to an end now, but what will replace it is not yet clear.
A second and related phenomenon is that the modem federal judiciary has
grown so hostile to civil rights that decisions narrowing the coverage of the
Nation's anti-discrimination laws have become the norm.8 With respect to the
FHA, this trend is reflected in two recent appellate decisions-Judge Posner's
2004 decision for the Seventh Circuit in Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes
of Dearborn Park Ass 'n9 and Judge Higginbotham's 2005 opinion for the Fifth
Circuit in Cox v. City of Dallas'°-which took remarkably narrow views of the
FHA and are the subject of this Article.
For most of its forty-year history, the FHA has been accorded a generous
construction by the courts.1" These expansive judicial decisions, however, have
generally dealt with litigation issues, such as standing to sue and the timeliness
of FHA claims. 2 As for its substantive provisions, the FHA has often been
interpreted simply by following the doctrine developed under Title VII, the
federal employment discrimination law passed four years before the FHA.
13
Many of the FHA's key substantive provisions do track Title VIl's language, but
8. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2171-72 (2007)
(interpreting Title VH's statute of limitations to cut off plaintiff's claim of long-term sex
discrimination); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2800 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that "no Member of the Court that
I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's decision," which interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause to bar race-based efforts to achieve public school integration); see also THE EROSION OF
RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 49-69
(William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.cccr.orgldownloads/civil-rights2.pdf
(critiquing the Bush Administration's judicial appointments from a civil rights prospective).
9. 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
10. 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005).
11. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1972) (noting that
the FHA's language is "broad and inclusive," that the statute carries out "a policy that Congress
considered to be of the highest priority," and that it should be given "a generous construction");
accordCity of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725,731 (1995) (reaffirming Trafficante's
view that the FHA is entitled to a "generous construction"); see also Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982) (commenting on the FHA's "broad remedial intent").
12. For example, the Court in Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10, and Havens, 455 U.S. at 372-
79, extended standing to sue under the FHA to the limits of Article III. In Havens, 455 U.S. at 380-
81, the Court also recognized the "continuing violation" theory as a way of defeating the statute-of-
limitations defense in FHA cases. In City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 731-37, the Court dealt with an
FHA exemption that the Court narrowly construed.
13. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). For
cases interpreting the FHA by referring to Title VII precedents, see ROBERTG. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 7:4 nn.4-5 (2007).
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some FHA coverage issues do not have a ready analogy in Title VII law and
have, as a result, caused difficulties. One such issue is whether the FHA
prohibits the discriminatory provision of municipal services to minority
communities, which was the issue presented in Cox" and which is the main focus
of this Article.
Municipalities have always been understood to be proper defendants under
the FHA. 5 From the beginning, courts have made clear that the FHA prevents
such defendants from operating their public housing projects in racially
discriminatory ways 6 and from using their zoning powers to block housing
developments on racial grounds.' 7 In providing services like garbage removal or
police protection, however, municipalities exercise a less direct impact on
housing choice, and whether the FHA may be used to challenge the inferior
provision of such services to residents of minority neighborhoods is an unsettled
issue. This issue is not clearly addressed in the text of the FHA, nor was it
discussed in the statute's legislative history. Indeed, the pre-condition for claims
of discriminatory municipal services-the existence of identifiable minority-race,
ghetto-like neighborhoods-is a situation that the FHA's proponents sought to
end. 8
Both the pre-condition and the claims, however, have continued. In the
FHA's first two decades, a handful of courts expressed conflicting views about
whether the statute covered discriminatory municipal services. 9 This issue was
not dealt with by the Congress that passed the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments
Act,2" but soon thereafter, regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing
& Urban Development ("HUD") announced that the FHA did outlaw
discriminatory municipal services, at least in some circumstances. 2' With this
14. 430 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2005).
15. See, e.g., Ventura Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 419 F.3d 725,727-28 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citing numerous cases in support of the proposition that "[v]arious types of municipal actions have
been challenged under the FHA... [including]: refusal to grant a special-use permit; enforcement
of a spacing restriction; denial of government funding needed for a housing project; and
enforcement of an ordinance or policy restricting multi-family residences to certain areas of the city
or excluding public housing from non-minority neighborhoods" (footnotes omitted)); see also
SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 12B:5.
16. SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 28:5 n.ll (citing pertinent cases); see also Otero v. N.Y.
City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (2d Cir. 1973) (opining that the FHA requires
consideration of "the impact of proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration in
the area in which the proposed housing is to be built").
17. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.),
affdper curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); infra note 158. See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 13, §§ 13:8 to -: 10.
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part II.A.4.
20. Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619(1988). See infra Part I.B. 1 for a discussion of the 1988
FHAA's impact on the issue of whether the FHA covers discriminatory municipal services.
21. See infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
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background, Professor Calmore, writing in 1993 on the verge of a new
Democratic Administration, argued that "there is tremendous untapped potential
to further the goal of spatial equality [i.e., equal treatment for minority
communities]" through reliance on the FHA, which, he concluded, "protects not
only the person seeking to secure housing on a non-discriminatory basis, but also
... the right of equal services and facilities once the person actually has secured
the housing." 2
The courts, however, have continued to take a decidedly mixed view of this
matter,23 and the most recent appellate review of this issue-the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Cox24-produced a resounding "No." According to the Cox opinion,
homeowners in a black neighborhood have no FHA rights to complain that they
are receiving inferior municipal services to those enjoyed in comparable white
neighborhoods, at least unless the discrimination becomes so egregious that the
plaintiffs are "constructively evicted" from their homes. Indeed, a key
precedent relied on by Cox-the Seventh Circuit's decision in Halprin26 -
suggests that the FHA generally does not provide any protection for homeowners,
as opposed to homeseekers.2 ' Together, Cox and Halprin marked the first time
in four decades that the federal appellate courts have determined that the FHA's
substantive coverage should be significantly narrowed.
This Article deals with Cox, Halprin, and the issue of whether the FHA
should be interpreted to outlaw discrimination in the provision of services by
local governments. Part I describes the Cox litigation and its connection with
Halprin. Part II surveys the pre-Cox cases that have dealt with discriminatory
municipal services. Part 11 analyzes the FHA's relevant provisions and their
legislative history and concludes that Cox and Halprin were wrong to deny FHA
protection to current residents. Part IV builds on this analysis to provide a
sounder approach to FHA claims alleging discriminatory municipal services.
Although the result in Cox may be defended, this Article's ultimate conclusion
is that the analysis in Cox and Halprin is so flawed, and in particular has so
misconstrued § 3604(b) of the FHA, that it should be rejected by other courts.28
22. Calmore, supra note 7, at 1514 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), which is the FHA's
provision outlawing discriminatory housing services and facilities).
23. See infra Parts II.A.4, H.B.3.
24. 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005).
25. Id. at 740-47.
26. 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
27. See id. at 328-30.
28. This comment is not limited to federal courts outside the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, but
also includes state courts, which may entertain FHA-based claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A)
(2000), and which may also be called upon to interpret their own state or local fair housing laws.
Most states and scores of local governments have fair housing laws that are substantially equivalent
to the FHA. For a list of these states and localities, see ScHwEMM, supra note 13, app. c.
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I. THE Cox LITIGATION AND THE HALPR1N ISSUE
A. Cox v. City of Dallas: Background
The Cox litigation involved an illegal dump site in the predominantly black
neighborhood of Deepwood in Dallas, Texas.2 9 Deepwood had been annexed by
the City of Dallas in 1956 and zoned residential, but in 1963, the City authorized
operation of a gravel pit at an eighty-five-acre site in the neighborhood.3" Prior
to 1963, Deepwood was predominantly white, but during the 1970s, the area
changed to predominantly black.3'
As this racial transition was occurring, the owner of the gravel pit replaced
the pit's excavated sand and gravel with solid waste.32 Beginning in 1982,
residents complained to the city that massive illegal dumping was going on at this
site.33 At one point in 1988, "the site caught fire and burned for seven months."34
At various times, even city contractors used the site to improperly dispose of
solid wastes. 35 Another fire broke out and continued to bum for at least two
months in 1997.36 For over twenty-five years, illegal dumping occurred, resulting
in substantial deposits of uncovered solid waste, "including household waste,
tires, demolition debris, insulation, asphalt shingles, abandoned automobiles,jugs
and bottles labeled 'sulfuric acid' and 'nitric acid,' 55-gallon drums, and
syringes. 37 Snakes and rats were attracted to the area, and the site was easily
29. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 2005).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Cox was one of a number of cases that arose in the 1970s and 1980s alleging that
waste dumps were being placed in minority and poor neighborhoods based on intentional
discrimination against these groups. See, e.g., Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It?
Environmental Justice in the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CoRNELLL. REV. 1001,
1004 n. 10, 1009-14 (1993) (citing cases and describing studies finding that undesirable land uses
were being disproportionately sited in black and poor areas). As Professor Been points out,
however, a "chicken-and-egg" issue existed in many of these cases; that is, whether municipalities
were allowing hazardous waste sites and other undesirable uses more often in minority
neighborhoods because of racial discrimination or whether minorities moved to neighborhoods that
had low-priced housing because these areas had earlier been targeted for such uses. See id. at 1015-
27; see also Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L. J. 1383 (1994). The Cox case never
depended on a resolution of this issue, however, because the minority plaintiffs there alleged that
after they had become the predominant race in Deepwood, the City discriminated against their
neighborhood by allowing illegal dumping to continue. See infra text accompanying notes 33-47.
33. Cox, 430 F.3d at 736.
34. Id. at 737.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 739.
37. Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2001).
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accessible to neighborhood children.38
During this time, the City undertook a number of steps to limit continued
dumping, including twice suing the site's owners (one of whom spent forty-nine
days in jail for ignoring an anti-dumping restraining order), issuing scores of
code-violation citations, and arresting dozens of people.39 These enforcement
efforts were ultimately characterized by the courts as "inconsistent, inadequate,
and largely ineffective,"' "erratic," and "ineffectual.'
In 1998, residents of Deepwood who had purchased their homes between
1970 and 1978 filed two federal lawsuits against the City and others alleging
both civil rights and environmental law violations.42 The district court dealt with
these claims separately. 43 Turning first to the environmental claim under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act," the court certified an injunctive
relief class action on behalf of homeowners near the Deepwood dump site and,
after a bench trial, ruled against the City in 1999."5 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
38. Id. The Fifth Circuit also noted additional effects from the Deepwood dump:
resulting fumes polluting the neighborhood air; a significant fire hazard continues to
exist at the dump; the State's reports reveal that there is an imminent threat of the
discharge of municipal solid waste into Elam Creek, a tributary of the Trinity River,
because of the massive illegal dumping; the State itself has noted that waste at the
Deepwood dump may cause contamination of surface water and ground water through
the leaching of contaminates from the debris by rainwater; asbestos, bezo(a)athracene,
and benzene (in excess of state limits) have been detected at the Deepwood dump; and
the City itself has long maintained that the Deepwood dump poses a hazard to the public
health.
Id. at 300.
39. Cox, 430 F.3d at 738-39.
40. Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL 2108253, at *11 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), affd, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005).
41. Cox, 430 F.3d at 737; see also infra text accompanying note 60.
42. Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL 370242, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 24, 2004) (describing procedural history of both suits, which were consolidated and later
bifurcated).
43. Id. (addressing the civil rights claims); Cox v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-0291, 1999
WL 33756551 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 1999), affd, 256 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2001) (addressing
environmental law violations).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). This law, inter alia, authorizes private litigation against
those who have contributed to the prohibited open dumping of solid wastes. See id. §
6972(a)(1)(B).
45. Cox, 1999 WL 33756551. Certain state defendants were exonerated. Id. at *1. As to the
City, the court held that it had, in the words of the statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), been a
"generator" of solid waste "who has contributed to" the "disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." See
id. As relief, the court ordered the City, inter alia, to erect a fence around the site to exclude
unauthorized use; to monitor the site to determine its current hazards and to prevent additional
dumping; to remove all solid wastes from the site; and to restore the site "to a condition that is free
[Vol. 41:717
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this ruling two years later.46
As to the civil rights claims, which were not prosecuted as a class action, the
plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination, pointing to "two sites located in ... white
neighborhoods where the City did remedy illegal dumping and/or illegal
mining. '47  This discrimination was claimed to violate § 3604(a)4' and §
3604(b) 49 of the FHA, certain HUD regulations implementing the FHA, ° the
1866 Civil Rights Act (specifically 42 U.S.C. § 198 1),"' and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (on the basis of which plaintiffs claimed
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).52
from hazardous or nuisance conditions." Id. at *2; see also Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281,
288 (5th Cir. 2001).
46. Cox, 256 F.3d at 284.
47. See Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *11.
48. Fair Housing Act § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). This section of the FHA makes
it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." Id.
49. Fair Housing Act § 804(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000). This section of the FHA makes
it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." Id.
50. See Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *8-9 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b) and § 100.70(d)(4), the
texts of which are set forth infra in, respectively, the text accompanying note 220 and note 219).
51. The 1866 Civil Rights Act is made up of two substantive sections, now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a) and § 1982, the texts of which are set forth infra in, respectively, note 129 and
the text accompanying note 131. The former provision, which was relied on in Cox, guarantees all
persons nondiscrimination in contracts, while § 1982 guarantees all citizens nondiscrimination in
property rights. As shown later in this Article, § 1982 has regularly been used to challenge
discriminatory municipal services for over three decades, see infra Part II.A.2 and notes 150 and
171, and it is unclear why the Cox plaintiffs did not rely on § 1982 along with § 1981. The only
textual advantage of § 1981 appears to be that it protects "persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States," whereas § 1982 protects only "citizens of the United States," and perhaps the Cox
plaintiffs included some non-citizens. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint In 22, 80, Cox v.
City of Dallas, 2004 WL 370242 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24,2004) (No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-1763BH), 1998
WL 35231051 (alleging, as to the plaintiffs, only that they "are African-American homeowners who
reside near or adjacent to the illegal Deepwood dump" and citing, as the bases for the plaintiffs'
race discrimination claims, only § 1981 and § 3604(a) of the FHA).
52. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 2005). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
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As to the FHA claims, the district court granted the City's motion for
summary judgment in early 2004."3 It rejected the plaintiffs' § 3604(a) claim on
the ground that this provision's ban of discriminatory practices that "make
unavailable or den[y]" housing does not cover homeowners who seek to "protect
intangible interests in already-owned property, such as habitability or value. 54
The § 3604(b) claim failed because this provision was seen as applying "only to
discrimination in the provision of services that precludes the sale or rental of
housing[, and p]laintiffs have not alleged discrimination related to the acquisition
of their homes."55  Under these circumstances, the court also rejected the
plaintiffs' claim based on HUD's FHA regulations. 6
At the same time it disposed of these FHA claims, the district court rejected
the City's motion for summary judgment on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims, 7
holding that there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact "to find racially
discriminatory intent in the City's failure to stop the illegal dumping"58 and, as
to the additional requirement for municipal liability under § 1983, that there was
a triable issue as to "whether the City's failure to terminate the illegal dumping
at the Deepwood site was the result of execution of one of its customs or
policies. 59 Shortly thereafter, these claims were tried to the court, which issued
an opinion later in 2004 in favor of the City, holding that the § 1983 claim failed
for lack of proof of an official policy and the § 1981 claim failed because the
evidence, while supporting "an inference of gross negligence by the City
exemplified by lackadaisical code enforcement, absence of communication
between city departments, and virtually no follow-through by either the Board of
Adjustment or the City Attorney's office," did not establish "an intent to
discriminate against [the plaintiffs] on the basis of race, rather than gross
negligence."6 °
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the vehicle by which claims based on violations of the U.S. Constitution and
certain federal statutes may be asserted. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
53. Cox, 2004 WL 370242, at *14.
54. Id. at *6 (citing Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743
F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984)).
55. Id. at *8.
56. Id. Once it determined that the plaintiffs' FHA claims should fail, the district court
ordered summary judgment against them on their § 1983 claim based on HUD's FHA regulations,
concluding that
[e]ven if the Court were to find that the regulations at issue were enforceable through
a private cause of action, [p]laintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law for the same reason
that their claims under the FHA fail. When regulations authoritatively construe a
statute, it is "meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the
regulations apart from the statute."
Id. at *8 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001)).
57. Id. at *13.
58. Id. at *12.
59. Id. at *13.
60. Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:98-CV- 1763BH, 2004 WL 2108253, at * 12, 16 (N.D.
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B. Halprin and Post-Acquisition Claims
While the Cox plaintiffs were appealing their losses on the FHA and other
civil rights claims to the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit decided Halprin v.
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass 'n.6" Halprin was the first
appellate decision to deny that current residents could invoke the protections of
§§ 3604(a) and 3604(b), although this position had been taken in a few trial court
opinions, including the one in COX.
62
The plaintiffs in Halprin were a couple who owned a home in an area where
a homeowners' association provided various services.63 One of the plaintiffs was
Jewish, and the couple alleged that the association, its president, and other
association members engaged in a campaign of religious harassment against them
that included anti-Jewish epithets, verbal threats, and vandalizing the plaintiffs'
property.6  The couple sued under § 3617 of the FHA,65 which outlaws
interference with persons who have exercised their rights under the FHA's
substantive provisions, here §§ 3604(a) and 3604(b).
Judge Posner's opinion concluded that these substantive provisions were
concerned only with "access to housing" and that, because the plaintiffs were not
complaining "about being prevented from acquiring property," they had "no
claim under [§1 3604. ' '66 Halprin conceded that if the defendants had burned
down a minority's house, they might have engaged in a form of "constructive
eviction" that would make the house "unavailable" under § 3604(a) or deny the
homeowner the § 3604(b)-covered "privilege of inhabiting the premises. Short
of this extreme example, however, Judge Posner opined that §§ 3604(a) and
3604(b) did not protect current residents. In doing so, he distinguished a number
of prior FHA cases brought by current residents, which he dismissed as not
Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), afftd, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005).
61. 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
62. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text; note SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 14:3
para. 1 nn.20-21 (citing relevant cases); Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n, No. 1:03-CV-
69-LTM-WTL, 2004 WL 192106, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22,2004), aff'd, 191 F. App'x 446 (7th Cir.
2006); Laramore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
63. 388 F.3d at 328.
64. Id.
65. Fair Housing Act § 817, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000). Section 3617 provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment
of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 3617.
66. 388 F.3d at 329-30.
67. Id. at 329. "Constructive eviction" generally refers to a "landlord's act of making
premises unfit for occupancy, often with the result that the tenant is compelled to leave." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 594 (8th ed. 2004).
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having "contain[ed] a considered holding on the scope of the Fair Housing
Act. ' 68 Judge Posner also refused to interpret the FHA as broadly as Title VII,
which he recognized "protects the job holder as well as the job applicant."'69 The
FHA's language is different, he noted, concluding that this difference reflects the
fact that Congress's concern in the housing statute extends only to the property-
acquiring stage and ceases once persons are "allowed to own or rent homes."7
Thus, the Halprin plaintiffs, as current homeowners whose complaint was that
the defendants were harassing them on discriminatory grounds, could not assert
a claim relating to the "sale or rental" of their dwelling in violation of either §
3604(a) and § 3604(b).7
Having determined that current homeowners have no § 3604 rights--other
than possibly not to be burned out or otherwise constructively evicted from their
homes-Halprin strongly suggested that the anti-interference guarantee of §
3617 could also not be invoked by such plaintiffs. 72 However, because of two
special circumstances in Halprin, the plaintiffs' § 3617 claim was upheld.
73
First, HUD's regulation interpreting § 3617 extends to interference with
"enjoyment of a dwelling, 74 which Halprin conceded "can take place after the
dwelling has been acquired."75 This regulation, Judge Posner argued, goes well
beyond § 3617's language and may therefore be invalid "because that section
provides legal protection only against acts that interfere with one or more of the
other sections of the Act," which he had earlier held "is not addressed to post-
acquisition discrimination."76 Second, the Halprin defendants had not challenged
this regulation's validity, and therefore the Seventh Circuit held that the
plaintiffs' § 3617 claim survived.77 Still, the clear implication of this part of
Halprin is that in future cases brought by current residents, defendants may
challenge the HUD regulation, and, if successful, defeat a post-acquisition
interference claim under § 3617.78
68. 388 F.3d at 329 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972);
Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 2003); Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d
487 (7th Cir. 1997); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1
F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 329-30.
72. Id. at 330.
73. Id.
74. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2007). This regulation provides that conduct made unlawful
by § 3617 includes "[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of
a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of
such persons, or of visitors or associates of such persons." Id.
75. 388 F.3d at 330.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. On remand, the district court upheld HUD's regulation, thereby preserving the plaintiffs'
§ 3617 claim. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, No. 01 C
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The Halprin opinion may be criticized on a variety of grounds, many of
which I have identified elsewhere.79 Furthermore, the Justice Department and
HUD have taken the position in their FHA-enforcement litigation that Halprin
was wrong in holding that § 3604 does not apply to post-acquisition
discrimination.8 ' Halprin's flaws have also been discussed in two fine articles,
one by Professor Short dealing primarily with harassment cases under the FHA '
and one by Professor Oliveri dealing more broadly with the FHA's coverage in
§ 3604.2 Among the identified failures of Judge Posner's opinion in Halprin
are: (1) its cavalier dismissal of prior case law, which had generally assumed that
§ 3604(b) does protect residents from discriminatory treatment after they have
acquired their homes;8 3 (2) its failure to confront HUD regulations interpreting
4673, 2006 WL 2506223, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2006). Other post-Halprin decisions have
generally agreed that this regulation is valid. See, e.g., George v. Colony Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n,
No. 1:05 CV-05899, 2006 WL 1735345, at *2-3 (N.D. 111. June 16, 2006); King v. Metcalf 56
Homes Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (D. Kan. 2005); United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp.
2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-OGRJ, 2005 WL 1065141,
at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 2,2005); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970,978-80 (D. Neb. 2004).
The only exception seems to be Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No.
CIV.A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (rejecting current
resident's § 3617 claim, which was brought pro se, and adopting the view that "24 C.F.R. §
100.400(c)(2) is invalid").
As is implicit in the Altmayer and Koch decisions, the Justice Department has actively
defended HUD's view that § 3617 covers post-acquisition claims. See generally Altmayer, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 862; Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970. For its part, the Seventh Circuit has twice after Halprin
avoided ruling on the regulation's validity by finding that the defendant, as in Halprin, waived this
issue and then ruling against the plaintiff-resident's § 3617 claim on the merits. See Walton v.
Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n, 191 F. App'x 446, 450-52 (7th Cir. 2006); East-Miller v. Lake
County Highway Dep't, 421 F.3d 558, 562-64 & n.l (7th Cir. 2005).
79. See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 14:3 nn.10-42 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition
to Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at n.3, George v. Colony Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, No.
1:05-CV-05899, 2006 WL 1735345 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2006), 2006 WL 1437953 (stating the
Justice Department's belief "that [§] 3604 applies to post-acquisition discrimination" and its
disagreement with Halprin's contrary conclusion); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., HUD Charges Virginia Beach Landlord with Violating the Fair Housing Act: Owner Accused
of Treating Black Families Worse, Using Racial Slurs (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.hud.gov/news/ release.cfm?content=pr07-067.cfm (describing HUD's charge accusing
apartment owner of violating the FHA by, inter alia, "subjecting African-American tenants to
stricter rules than others").
81. See Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58
ALA. L. REv. 203 (2006).
82. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants
Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2008).
83. See, e.g., Woodard v. Fanboy, L.L.C., 298 F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (1 th Cir. 2002) (dealing
with sexual harassment); Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Sterling, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1192-93 (C.D. Cal.
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§§ 3604(a) and 3604(b) to apply to discrimination against current residents;8' (3)
its misreading of the FHA's legislative history to indicate a concern only with
access to housing;85 (4) its lack of awareness of the impact of the 1988 Fair
Housing Amendments Act;86 (5) its refusal to interpret the FHA in line with Title
VII doctrine;8 7 and (6) its failure to see how its narrow interpretation of the FHA
would frustrate the statute's policy goals.88
Despite these flaws,89 Judge Posner's ultimate conclusion in Halprin that the
2004) (dealing with racial and national origin harassment); N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Allen,
319 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974, 980-81 (D.N.D. 2004) (dealing with racial harassment); Texas v. Crest
Asset Mgmt., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730-33 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (dealing with national origin
harassment); Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1292-93 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dealing
with restricting families with children from using apartment complex's swimming pool); Reeves
v. Carrollsburg Condo. Owners Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU, 1997 WL 1877201, at *5-8
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1997) (dealing with race and sexual harassment); United States v. Sea Winds of
Marco, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (upholding § 3604(b) claim based on
allegation that condominium enforced a renter-identification and monitoring policy only against
Hispanic tenants); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522,525-26
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (upholding § 3604(b) claim against landlord who provided poorer services over
a period of time as its tenants changed from white to black); HUD v. Jerrard, Fair Housing-Fair
Lending Rep. (Aspen) 25,005, at 25,090 (HUD ALT Sept. 28, 1990) (dealing with race-based
harassment and rent increase); HUD v. Murphy, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen)
25,002, at 25,053 (HUD ALT July 13, 1990) (holding that § 3604(b)'s ban on familial status
discrimination was violated by mobile home park that precluded current tenants from building a
clubhouse for their children and by maintaining the playground in an unsafe and unusable condition
for children); see also cases cited infra notes 174, 180, and 241 (pre-Halprin decisions suggesting
or holding that § 3604(b) covers claims by residents of minority neighborhoods alleging
discriminatory municipal services); sources cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 14:3 nn.3 & 5;
sources cited id. § 14:3 n.26 (dealing with sexual harassment).
As the court stated with respect to § 3604(b) in Housing Rights Center v. Sterling: "The FHA
thus not only demands that tenants be able to secure an apartment on a nondiscriminatory basis, but
also 'guarantees their right to equal treatment once they have become residents of that housing."'
404 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (quoting Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1148 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
84. See, e.g., Oliveri, supra note 82, at 13-16. Since 1989, HUD regulations interpreting §
3604(b) have identified a number of practices banned by this provision that affect current residents.
See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2), (4) (2007) (both of which were promulgated at 54 Fed. Reg.
3232, 3285 (Jan. 23, 1989) and are quoted infra note 217 and accompanying text).
85. See Oliveri, supra note 82, at 18-21, 25-32; Short, supra note 81, at 222-39; infra Part
III.B.
86. See infra Part II.B. 1.
87. See Oliveri, supra note 82, at 24-25; Short, supra note 81, at 240-44; infra Part IH.C.I.
88. See Oliveri, supra note 82, at 25-32, 62; Short, supra note 81, at 250-54; infra notes 271-
78 and accompanying text.
89. In addition to the reasons discussed in the text, the Halprin court's narrow reading of §
3604(b) is inconsistent with the long-held view that the FHA should be given a broad interpretation.
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FHA does not cover post-acquisition discrimination may still be correct if it is
an accurate reading of the statutory language used in §§ 3604(a) and 3604(b).
This language is, of course, the primary consideration in interpreting these
provisions.' As will be discussed in more detail later, the statutory language
may justify an interpretation of § 3604(a) that is limited to the acquisition of
housing, but § 3604(b)'s terms are far more ambiguous on this issue.91
C. The Fifth Circuit's 2005 Decision in Cox
The FHA and other civil rights aspects of Cox were argued to the Fifth
Circuit after the Halprin decision. On November 9, 2005, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the defendants' victory on all counts in an opinion by Judge
Higginbotham.
92
As to the FHA, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' "make unavailable
or deny" claim under § 3604(a), concluding that: "The failure of the City to
police the Deepwood landfill may have harmed the housing market, decreased
home values, or adversely impacted homeowners' 'intangible interests,' but such
results do not make dwellings 'unavailable' within the meaning of the Act.,
93
The court concluded, based on a review of Halprin and other decisions, that "the
simple language of § 3604(a) does not apply to current homeowners whose
complaint is that the value or 'habitability' of their houses has decreased because
such a complaint is not about 'availability.' 94  Judge Higginbotham
recognized-as Halprin had95-that a defendant's discrimination could have
such a devastating effect on a homeowner that the latter might have a § 3604(a)
claim for "constructive eviction,"96 but he held that current owners have no right
under § 3604(a) based on the claim that "the value or 'habitability' of their
property has decreased due to discrimination in the delivery of protective city
services."97
See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 7:2; supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also SCHWEMM,
supra note 13, § 14:3 n. 10 (elaborating on this principle to criticize the Halprin court's misuse of
the FHA's legislative history).
90. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) ("[T]he starting point
in every case involving the construction of a statute is the language itself.") (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also infra
note 255 and accompanying text.
91. See infra Part III.
92. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 740.
94. Id. at 741 (referring, inter alia, to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Jersey Heights
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 1999) (described infra notes 231
and 234 and the text accompanying note 237) and the Third Circuit's decision in Tenafly Eruv
Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002) (described infra note 231)).
95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
96. 430 F.3d at 742-43 & nn.20-21.
97. Id. at 742-43 (footnote omitted).
2008]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
As for the plaintiffs' § 3604(b) claim, the Fifth Circuit held that, even were
the City's action considered a "service" under this provision, "§ 3604(b) is
inapplicable here because the service was not 'connected' to the sale or rental of
a dwelling as the statute requires."98 To accept the plaintiffs' argument that §
3604(b)'s "services" need not be connected with a sale or rental would,
according to the Cox opinion, turn the FHA into a "general anti-discrimination
[statute], creating rights for any discriminatory act which impacts property
values-say, for generally inadequate police protection in a certain area."99
Judge Higginbotham wrote that the FHA must "remain[] a housing statute....
That the corrosive bite of racial discrimination may soak into all facets of black
lives cannot be gainsaid, but this statute targets only housing."'"' ° Thus, §
3604(b), while available to homeowners whose complaints deal with
discrimination in the initial purchase of their homes or their actual or
constructive eviction therefrom, "does not aid plaintiffs, whose complaint is that
the value or 'habitability' of their houses has decreased."' '
Finally, as to the Cox plaintiffs' § 1981 and equal protection claims, the Fifth
Circuit held that the trial judge's findings that the plaintiffs' proof failed to show
official action or discriminatory intent were not clearly erroneous. 10 2 The
appellate court opined that municipal liability under both § 1981 and the Equal
Protection Clause requires proof that the violation of the plaintiffs rights
resulted from an official policy or custom.'0 3 It held that, although the district
court correctly concluded that "'the City's efforts to stop the illegal dumping at
Deepwood were inconsistent, inadequate, and largely ineffective for years,'"
those efforts only "amounted to 'negligence,' not a custom.""'
The Cox plaintiffs sought rehearing en banc, which the Fifth Circuit denied
in late 2005.15 Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, seeking review only of the ruling on their FHA claim, 10 6 but the
98. Id. at 745. The court's opinion in Cox noted what it viewed as a split among the circuits
as to whether the City's enforcement of its zoning laws could be considered a service for purposes
of § 3604(b). Id. at 745 n.34. This part of the Cox opinion is further discussed infra note 369 and
accompanying text.
99. 430 F.3d at 746.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 747-49.
103. Id. at 748. This part of the appellate opinion in Cox is further discussed infra note 373
and accompanying text.
104. 430 F.3d at 749 (footnotes omitted).
105. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 166 F. App'x 163 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
106. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at *i, Cox, 547 U.S. 1130 (2006) (No. 05-1226), 2006
WL 755783. The question presented by this petition was
[w]hether black homeowners are denied the protection of an aggrieved persons claim
[sic] under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, solely because they already own
their homes where they allege their homes have been made ineligible for sale because
of the conditions created by the City's racially discriminatory provision of zoning
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Court denied this petition on May 15, 2006.107
HI. PRE-Cox LAW INVOLVING DISCRIMINATORY MUNICIPAL SERVICES
Litigation accusing municipalities of providing inferior services to minority
communities dates back at least to the 1960s and continues to the present day.
108
This Part reviews the pre-Cox cases involving discriminatory municipal services.
As in Cox, the plaintiffs in these cases often invoked the Equal Protection Clause
and other civil rights laws, as well as the FHA. Indeed, decisions opining on the
FHA's applicability to such cases generally came after the availability of these
other legal theories had become well established.
A. The 1968-1988 Period
1. Equal Protection Claims: Hawkins v. Town of Shaw and Its
Progeny.-In the early 1970s, the Fifth Circuit ruled in Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw"° that the defendants' practice of providing inferior municipal services to
black neighborhoods violated the Equal Protection Clause."0 Shaw' s 1500 black
and 1000 white residents were residentially segregated, with 97% of the black-
occupied homes being located in neighborhoods where no whites resided"' and
where dramatically inferior municipal services were provided." 2 Shaw' s black
residents sought injunctive relief against the relevant Town officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983' 3 in a class action filed before the FHA became effective."
4
enforcement and other municipal services?
Id.
107. Cox, 547 U.S. 1130.
108. For examples of modem cases, see infra note 398.
109. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), affd on reh'g en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
110. Id. at 1291-92.
111. Id. at 1288.
112. The evidence showed that: (1) blacks accounted for 98% of all persons "who live[d] in
homes fronting on unpaved streets"; (2) high-power street lights were installed only in white areas;
(3) "while 99% of white residents [were] served by a sanitary sewer system, nearly 20% of the black
population" was not; (4) while the drainage problems in white communities had been addressed by
underground storm sewers or drainage ditches, black neighborhoods had only a "poorly maintained
system of drainage ditches" or none at all; and (5) water pressure was inadequate far more often in
black than white neighborhoods. Id. at 1289-91.
113. See supra note 52. During this time, the prevailing view of § 1983 was that it covered
local officials, but not municipalities. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 187-92, overruled
by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In 1978, after the Hawkins litigation had
ended, the Supreme Court changed its interpretation of § 1983 to permit claims against
municipalities as well as their officials. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
114. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162, 1163 n. 1 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (referring
to an early order in the case dated July 12, 1968). The FHA became effective as to most non-
governmental housing on January 1, 1969. See Fair Housing Act § 803(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §
3603(a)(2) (2000).
2008]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
In 1969, the district court ruled for the defendants, concluding that their
"policy of slowly providing basic municipal services to the town's inhabitants"" 5
was not based on race, but on fiscal conservatism and other "rational
considerations."'1 6 In 1971, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
demonstrated racial differences in municipal services required a compelling
justification that the defendants had failed to provide.' 17 The panel held that this
violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the defendants were ordered to submit
a remedial plan "to cure the results of [this] long history of discrimination." '118
A year later, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed this judgment and
order." 9
Both the panel and en banc decisions rejected the defendants' argument that,
because their inferior treatment of black neighborhoods was not shown to have
been prompted by discriminatory intent, no equal protection violation was
established. 2 ° As the en banc opinion put it: "In order to prevail in a case of this
type it is not necessary to prove intent, motive or purpose to discriminate on the
part of city officials."'' This view would ultimately be rejected by the Supreme
Court in 1975 in Washington v. Davis,122 which adopted a purposeful
discrimination requirement for equal protection claims.
123
Even with this intent requirement, however, a number of cases patterned after
Hawkins were successfully prosecuted in the South under the Equal Protection
Clause in the late 1970s and early 1980s.'24 Like Hawkins, these cases often
115. Hawkins, 303 F. Supp. at 1168.
116. Id. at 1168-69.
117. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1292. At the trial court level, the Hawkins plaintiffs alleged wealth,
as well as race, discrimination, but they did not pursue their wealth-based claim on appeal. Id. at
1287 n.1.
118. Id. at 1293.
119. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
120. See id. at 1172-73 (en banc opinion); 437 F.2d at 1291-92 (panel opinion).
121. Hawkins, 461 F.2d at 1172.
122. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
123. Id. at 238-48. In Washington, the Supreme Court cited Hawkins with disapproval as an
example of an equal protection decision based on discriminatory effect instead of discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 244 n.12. For examples of post-Washington appellate decisions recognizing that
equal protection challenges to discriminatory municipal services now require proof of the
defendant's discriminatory intent, see Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 987 (11 th Cir. 1986);
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (11 th Cir. 1983).
124. See, e.g., Ammons, 783 F.2d at 983 (affirming judgment in a class action filed in 1981
based on finding that defendants intentionally discriminated in providing inferior street paving and
related services and storm water drainage facilities to black neighborhoods in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F.
Supp. 571, 573, 590 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (finding in a class action filed in 1981 that defendants
intentionally discriminated in providing inferior street paving and related services to black
neighborhoods in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Bryant v. City of Marianna, 532 F.
Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (entering default judgment in a class action filed in 1980 based
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revealed municipal discrimination against black neighborhoods that dated back
to the Jim Crow era, making discriminatory intent easy to infer. The Hawkins
theory was also endorsed by a few courts outside of the South in the 1970s, but
these cases generally resulted in judgments for the municipal defendants based
on insufficient evidence of illegal discrimination.'25 In 1981, the Supreme Court
appeared to approve the Hawkins theory, at least for intent-based claims, when
it commented that a municipality could not take "action benefitting white
property owners that would be refused to similarly situated black property
owners." 1
26
2. § 1982 Claims and City of Memphis v. Greene.-Two months after
passage of the 1968 FHA, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.127 that the 1866 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982) outlaws
private, as well as public, discrimination in housing. 2  Although the Jones
opinion cited § 1981's right to "contract,"1 29 its main focus was § 1982's
on defendants' discrimination in providing inferior street paving and maintenance, water and sewer
services, drainage facilities, fire protection, parks and recreation facilities, and street lighting to
black neighborhoods in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI); Johnson v. City of
Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1376-79 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (finding in a class action filed in 1976 that
defendants intentionally discriminated in providing inferior street paving, parks and recreation
facilities, and water service to black neighborhoods in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
Title VI); Selmont Improvement Ass'n v. Dallas County Comm'n, 339 F. Supp. 477,481 (S.D. Ala.
1972) (ruling for plaintiffs under the Hawkins theory based on defendants' discrimination in
providing inferior street paving to black neighborhoods); see also Campbell v. Bowlin, 724 F.2d
484, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1984) (reversing directed verdict for defendants in § 1983 claim against
municipality and its officials who were accused of denying water and sewer facilities to plaintiffs
land in a predominantly black neighborhood based on intentional discrimination).
125. See, e.g., Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 288-91 (2d Cir. 1972) (accepting the Hawkins
"principle that serious and continued discrimination in the level of effort expended on municipal
services to areas predominantly populated by minority racial groups violates the equal protection
clause," but affirming ruling in favor of defendants because their failure to maintain a particular
park in a minority area was based not on their lack of effort, but continuous vandalism); Burner v.
Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44, 46, 54 (D.D.C. 1975) (accepting Hawkins as the "leading case on
discrimination in the provision of municipal services," but holding that the plaintiffs had failed to
show illegal racial discrimination in police, fire, recreation services, trash removal, and sidewalk
construction); see also Mlikotin v. City of L.A., 643 F.2d 652, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming
dismissal of equal protection claim of inferior municipal services to poor neighborhood because this
claim, unlike the one in Hawkins, was not based on racial discrimination).
126. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981) (§ 1982 case). This case is
discussed infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
127. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
128. Id. at 419-44.
129. See id. at 441-43. At the time of Jones, § 1981 provided:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
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guarantee of equal property rights, 30 which provides: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property." '131
Jones resurrected § 1981 and § 1982 as legal weapons against private
discrimination, but even before Jones, the 1866 Act was understood to outlaw
governmental discrimination.'32 Furthermore, in post-Jones cases, the Supreme
Court has made clear that § 1982 guarantees equal treatment in the terms and
conditions affecting a resident's property rights, as well as in the initial
opportunity to purchase and lease.'33
The principal Supreme Court case involving a § 1982 claim by minority
homeowners challenging discriminatory municipal services is City of Memphis
v. Greene,134 which was decided in 1981. In City of Memphis, residents of a
black neighborhood claimed that closing a street that linked them to a
neighboring white area adversely affected their rights to hold and enjoy their
property in violation of § 1982.' 5 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court rejected
this claim. Justice Stevens, writing for five members of the Court, 136 reviewed
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
and penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1981, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991). As
a result of amendments made to § 1981 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the quoted language
became 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a), with two additional subsections providing, respectively, that the term
"'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship" and that the rights protected by this provision extend to private, as well as public,
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a) (2000).
130. See 392 U.S. at 412-13.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
132. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30 (1948) (holding that § 1982 bars "judicial
enforcement of [racially] restrictive covenants by the courts of the District of Columbia");
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-82 (1917) (relying on the 1866 Act, along with the
Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down a municipal zoning ordinance that required residential racial
segregation).
133. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 435-37 (1973)
(holding that § 1982 guarantees a black purchaser of residential property the opportunity to join a
local recreation club that ties membership benefits to residency in the area); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234-38 (1969) (holding that § 1982 guarantees a black tenant the
right to obtain a membership share in a local recreational facility that ties membership to residency
in neighboring homes). Tillman is further discussed infra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
Sullivan is further discussed infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
134. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
135. Id. at 105.
136. Justice White concurred on another ground. Id. at 129-35 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented. Id. at 135-55 (Marshall, J.,
assenting).
[Vol. 41:717
COX, HALPRIN AND THE FHA
the record and determined that the City's decision was motivated not by racial
factors, but by traffic safety and other legitimate considerations. '37 He also found
that the street closing conferred a benefit on property owners in the white
neighborhood, but that there was no evidence that the City would refuse to do the
same for black property owners. 38 It was acknowledged that the closing caused
some inconvenience to black motorists who now had to find other routes around
the white neighborhood,'39 but Justice Stevens termed this "a routine burden of
citizenship"'" that had not affected the value of any property owned by the
plaintiffs.' 4 ' Based on this view of the record,'42 Justice Stevens concluded that
no § 1982 violation had been shown.'43
Even though the Court in City of Memphis rejected the plaintiffs' particular
claim, it did recognize three separate theories upon which § 1982-based
challenges to governmental action might succeed.'" The first of these covers
claims of discriminatory municipal services: "[T]he statute would support a
challenge to municipal action benefitting white property owners that would be
refused to similarly situated black property owners. For official action of that
kind would prevent blacks from exercising the same property rights as whites."
1 45
The second theory recognized in City of Memphis involves "official action that
depreciated the value of property owned by black citizens."' 46 "Finally, the
statute might be violated if the street closing severely restricted access to black
homes, because blacks would then be hampered in the use of their property."'
' 47
137. Id. at 119 (majority opinion).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 128.
140. Id. at 129.
141. Id. at 124, 129.
142. Justice Marshall's dissent provided a much different view of the record, which led him
to conclude that the City's actions had violated § 1982. Id. at 136-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 124 (majority).
144. See id. at 123.
145. Id.
146. Id. For a post-City of Memphis example of such a claim, see Terry Properties, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1536 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (ruling against black property owners' §
1982 claim on the ground that the plaintiffs "suffered zero damages from the [defendants'] closing
of Industrial Boulevard").
147. City of Memphis, 451 U.S. at 123. Here, the City of Memphis opinion cited with apparent
approval the Fifth Circuit's decision in Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974), as an
example of this theory:
In Jennings, the defendants placed a barricade across a street on the outskirts of
Dadeville, Ala., and prohibited landowners on the other side of the barricade from using
the street. All but one of the landowners so restricted were black, and the one white
landowner was given private access to the closed street. The street closing had the
effect of adding [one-and-one-half] to [two] miles to the trip into town. The court held
that the plaintiffs, "because they are black, have been denied the right to hold and enjoy
their property on the same basis as white citizens." Thus Jennings, unlike this case,
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The City of Memphis case also presented the issue of whether § 1982
requires proof that the defendant's actions are motivated by a discriminatory
purpose, but the Court did not decide this issue.'48 A year later, however, the
Court held that § 1981 claims do require such proof, 4 9 and subsequent lower
court decisions have assumed that § 1982 is subject to the same requirement.150
Thus, even though the City of Memphis opinion endorsed the use of § 1982 for
some types of discriminatory municipal services claims, such claims, like those
under the Equal Protection Clause, now require proof of discriminatory intent. 51
3. Title V.--Cases dating back to the 1970s have upheld discriminatory
municipal services claims based on Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
52
which provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving [f]ederal financial assistance."' 53 Since those earlier days, Title VI law
has undergone some important changes, and although private litigants may sue
involved a severe restriction on the access to property.
451 U.S. at 123 n.36 (quoting Jennings, 488 F.2d at 442). Thus, discriminatory municipal actions
that impose the kind of hardships on black homeowners that occurred in Jennings may be
challenged under § 1982. For a post-City of Memphis "road-closing-access-to-property" case where
the Fifth Circuit relied on Jennings to uphold a § 1982 claim, see Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661,
662 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981).
148. See City of Memphis, 451 U.S. at 129-30 (White, J., concurring).
149. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-91 (1982).
150. See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 27:19 n.12 and accompanying text.
151. Modem lower court cases, in addition to Cox, where the 1866 Act has been relied on as
a basis for challenging discriminatory municipal services include Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505
F. Supp. 2d 456,492-98 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (described infra note 398); Miller v. City of Dallas, No.
Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (denying summary
judgment for defendants in § 1981 claim alleging discrimination in various municipal services and
judging this claim by the same standards as an equal protection claim under § 1983); see also
Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 194-96 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding timeliness of § 1982 claim
brought by residents of black town claiming that the county was siting an undesirable landfill
nearby based on race); Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743
F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting claims based on, inter alia, § 1981 and § 1982
(discussed infra note 171)); cf. Ross v. Midland Mgmt. Co., No. 02-C-8190, 2003 WL 21801023,
at *2-4 (N.D. I1. Aug. 1, 2003) (reading City of Memphis as holding that § 1982 creates "a right
of action not only with respect to the purchase of property but also with respect to the use of
property" and therefore upholding tenant's discriminatory services claim under § 1982).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
153. Id. The cases include those so designated in supra note 124; those cited infra notes 157
and 236; and Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1014-17 (6th Cir.
1989) (upholding standing of neighborhood organization to bring a Title VI complaint alleging that
their members' property values were reduced because defendant "provides municipal services..
. to racially identifiable neighborhoods in a substantially inferior quality and quantity than the
services provided to other areas of Canton").
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under this statute,154 their claims are now limited to intent-based
discrimination.' 55 Furthermore, a defendant accused of such discrimination must
be a recipient of federal financial assistance.'56 Thus, plaintiffs bringing
municipal services claims under Title VI must show that the defendant-
municipality received federal financial assistance and has "discriminated against
them on the basis of race, the discrimination was intentional, and the
discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the City's actions." '57
4. Early FHA Cases.--Court decisions extending back to the earliest years
of the FHA have considered whether the discriminatory denial of municipal
services is actionable under this statute. In 1970, the Second Circuit in Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City ofLackawanna 58 ruled that the defendants violated the
Equal Protection Clause and the FHA based on their intentional discrimination
in blocking a minority housing project planned for a white neighborhood.'59
Lackawanna had initially blocked the project by rezoning the proposed site as a
park and by declaring a moratorium on new developments.' 60 After suit was
filed, the defendants rescinded these actions, but continued to stymie the project
by refusing it permission to tie into the City's sewer system.' 6' The case,
therefore, had elements of both exclusionary zoning and discriminatory
municipal services. In affirming the district court's judgment for the plaintiffs
in Kennedy Park, the Second Circuit did not distinguish between their equal
protection and FHA claims, but simply endorsed the trial court's view that the
City's overall behavior toward the proposed project manifested illegal racial
discrimination.
62
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United
Farm Workers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach,163 where
154. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (recognizing that Title VI
creates individual rights justifying an implied cause of action); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 279-80 (2001) (stating that "private individuals may sue to enforce ... Title VI").
155. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280-93.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, d-4a (2000); see, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,557
(1984).
157. Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 14,2002) (citing Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58,69 (2d Cir. 2001)). In Miller, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs' Title VI claim based on lack of evidence of defendant's racially
discriminatory motive in the City's use of CDBG funds, id. at * 11, while upholding other theories
requiring discriminatory intent. 2002 WL 230834. For a recent decision upholding a Title VI
claim based on discriminatory municipal services, see Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp.
2d 456, 492-98 (S.D. Ohio 2007); cf Ross v. Midland Management Co., 2003 WL 21801023, at
*3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) (upholding tenant's Title VI claim of discriminatory services).
158. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
159. Id. at 109-10.
160. Id. at 109.
161. Id. at 11.
162. Id. at 112-15.
163. 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the court's opinion took note of, but did not rely on, §§ 3604(a) and 3604(b) of
the FHA in holding that the defendant's refusal to extend water and sewer service
to a subsidized, heavily minority housing project violated the Equal Protection
Clause."6' The next appellate court to weigh in was the Fourth Circuit in 1984
in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Cos.,165 which opined in dicta that §
3604(b)' s prohibition against discriminatory housing services "encompasses such
things as garbage collection and other services of the kind usually provided by
municipalities."1 66  At least one court disagreed, however; in 1978, a
Pennsylvania district judge in Vercher v. Harrisburg Housing Authority167
rejected the view that § 3604(b) outlaws inferior police protection for black-
occupied housing, concluding that to say "that every discriminatory municipal
policy is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would be to expand that Act to a
civil rights statute of general applicability rather than one dealing with the
specific problems of fair housing opportunities."'
' 68
The first appellate case to provide a focused analysis of FHA coverage of
discriminatory municipal services was Southend Neighborhood Improvement v.
County of St. Clair,169 which was decided by the Seventh Circuit in 1984. The
plaintiffs in Southend were homeowners in a poor, black neighborhood who
alleged that the value of their homes was being diminished by the County's poor
maintenance of its tax delinquent properties in the plaintiffs' neighborhood. 70
They asserted claims under §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617 of the FHA, the 1866
164. Id. at 801-02, 802 n.4, 811 n.12.
165. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
166. Id. at 424. Mackey held that the FHA did not outlaw home insurance discrimination,
specifically that such discrimination did not make housing "unavailable" in violation of § 3604(a),
id. at 423, nor could home insurance "reasonably be described as the provision of a service in
connection with dwellings" under § 3604(b). Id. at 424. This holding was later rejected by a
number of courts, in part based on a subsequent HUD regulation interpreting the FHA to cover
home insurance. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2007) (providing that the FHA outlaws '[r]efusing
to provide . . . property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such . .. insurance
differently because of race [or other prohibited grounds]"); SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 13:15
nn. 16, 25 & 32 (citing pertinent cases).
167. 454 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
168. Id. at 424. Vercher was a § 3617 action by a former employee of the defendant housing
authority who claimed he had been fired for pursing the complaints of black tenants that they
received less protection by city police than did white-occupied housing. Id. The court noted that
this § 3617 claim could succeed if the FHA's substantive provisions covered such discrimination,
but it held that § 3604(b) could not be extended to include police protection: "Police protection is
not housing. Nor does it have any direct connection to the sale, rental, or occupancy of housing.
Certainly the amount of police protection citizens receive has some impact on their use and
enjoyment of their homes; but the same could be said of any municipal service." Id. While the
plaintiffs FHA claim thus failed, the court went on to hold that his situation could be remedied
with a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 425.
169. 743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1984).
170. Id. at 1208.
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Civil Rights Act, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, all of which
were rejected by the Seventh Circuit. 7' With respect to § 3604(a), the Southend
opinion noted that this provision by its terms focuses on practices that "affect[]
the availability of housing" and "is designed to ensure that no one is denied the
right to live where they choose for discriminatory reasons."' 72 Thus, according
to the Seventh Circuit, § 3604(a) "does not protect the intangible interests in the
already-owned property" alleged by the plaintiffs. 173 As to the § 3604(b) claim
of discriminatory services, Southend reasoned that "[tihat subsection applies to
services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire
protection or garbage collection" and that "the County decisions regarding how
to administer properties it holds by tax deed are distinct from these types of
services."'174 The Seventh Circuit ended its FHA analysis by concluding that
"[t]he Act was not designed to address the concerns raised by the complaint."'
' 75
The Southend opinion proved to be influential with respect to both §§
171. Id. at 1210, 1210 n.4, 1212-13. After disposing of the FHA claims in Southend, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the 1866 Act claims on the ground that "[t]he relationship between the
County's conduct and the alleged injuries to the plaintiffs' neighboring properties is too tenuous
to support a claim that the plaintiffs' contract or property rights under [§§] 1981 and 1982 were
infringed." Id. at 1211. Furthermore, Southend viewed the plaintiffs' injuries as not significant
enough under City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), see supra notes 134-48 and
accompanying text, to give rise to a violation of the 1866 Act. 743 F.2d at 1212. "Here, the ...
plaintiffs' ability to make contracts and manage their properties as protected under [§§] 1981 and
1982 could not have been affected in a significant manner by a County decision not to board up or
demolish a building." Id.
The Southend opinion did imply that the plaintiffs' § 1982 claim might have been upheld if
they had alleged that the County's neglect "affirmatively altered the character of their communities
in a manner that worsened their perceived plight" and thereby "constituted discriminatory damage
to their contract and property rights." Id. The Seventh Circuit also implied that a § 1982 claim
would be appropriate if the County "refused discriminatorily to extend available services to blacks."
Id.
The Southend plaintiffs' constitutional claims were dismissed on essentially the same ground
that doomed their 1866 Act claims-that is, that "[t]he County's conduct could have had at most
minimal impact" on the plaintiffs' neighborhood. Id. at 1213.
172. 743 F.2d at 1210.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Mackey held that home insurance discrimination did not violate either §§ 3604(a) or 3604(b), see
supra note 166, but it did opine in dicta that the latter provision outlaws some discriminatory
municipal services. 724 F.2d at 423-24. As the text indicates, Mackey's technique of holding
against the particular § 3604(b) claim presented, while commenting in dicta that this provision does
cover common municipal services, was followed by the Seventh Circuit in its Southend opinion.
743 F.2d at 1210.
175. Southend, 743 F.2d at 12 10. The plaintiffs' § 3617 claim was rejected on the ground that,
given the failure of their other FHA claims, the County's conduct could not be said to constitute
"interference with Fair Housing Act rights." Id. at 1210 n.4.
20081
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
3604(a) and 3604(b). As to § 3604(a), a number of pre-Southend decisions had
opined that this provision's "otherwise make unavailable or deny" prohibition
was "as broad as Congress could have made it."' 76  Southend obviously
disagreed, and the limitation it noted concerning this phrase's focus on making
housing "unavailable" has been followed in many subsequent cases rejecting §
3604(a) claims,'77 including some brought by minority homeowners alleging
discriminatory municipal services.'
In contrast, Southend's treatment of § 3604(b) had a broadening effect.
Although the Seventh Circuit ruled against the particular § 3604(b) claim there,
the court's dicta that this provision "applies to services generally provided by
governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection"'7 9
became the foundation for numerous subsequent decisions that recognized §
3604(b) as covering discriminatory municipal services. 8°
B. Modem FHA Law
1. The 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act.-In 1988, after nearly a decade
of consideration, Congress passed a major set of amendments to the FHA, known
as the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA").' 81 Among other things, the
FHAA outlawed familial status and handicap (disability) discrimination,
broadened the FHA's prohibition against financial discrimination in § 3605,
strengthened the FHA's enforcement system, brought § 3617 claims under this
enforcement system, and directed HUD to issue regulations interpreting the
amended FHA. 1
2
The latter provision soon resulted in a detailed set of FHA regulations, whose
relevance to this Article is explored in the next section. The FHAA's new
enforcement procedures are not directly relevant here, although they do reflect
the 1988 Congress's awareness of and frustration with the failure of the 1968
FHA to more effectively reduce housing discrimination against racial and ethnic
minorities.183 The other three changes made by the FHAA are also not directly
176. See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 13:4 n.2 and accompanying text (citing relevant cases).
177. See id. § 13:4 n.5 (citing relevant cases).
178. See infra cases cited in note 231.
179. Southend, 743 F.2d at 1210.
180. See infra cases cited in note 234; see also McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, No. 86-1674,
1987 WL 44775, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 1987) (unpublished decision) (upholding § 3604(b) claim
by developer of low-income, integrated housing based on allegation that City denied sewer service
to his proposed development because of race).
181. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. The FHAA's
legislative history is described in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 5:4.
182. See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 5:3.
183. Aware of HUD estimates that "2 million instances of housing discrimination [were
continuing to] occur each year," the Congress that passed the FHAA saw the 1968 FHA as having
been "ineffective because it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism." H.R. REP. No. 100-711,
at 15-16 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,2176-77. Thus, the FHAA was intended
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relevant to the FHA's coverage of municipal services discrimination against
minorities, but each lends itself to an argument as to how the relevant provisions
of the original FHA should be construed.
First, the FHAA substantially broadened the FHA's prohibition in § 3605 of
discrimination in home mortgages and other "real estate related transactions.""4
The practices covered by this new § 3605 explicitly include making loans for
"improving, repairing, or maintaining" dwellings, as well as those for
"purchasing or constructing" housing.8 5 This clearly indicates, contrary to Judge
Posner's opinion in Halprin,186 that the post-1988 FHA does extend its
protections to current residents as well as homeseekers. While this does not
directly challenge the Halprin-Cox determination to limit § 3604 to homeseekers,
it does undercut their view that the FHA is generally unconcerned with
discrimination against residents who have already acquired their homes.
8 7
As for outlawing discrimination against families with children, the technique
by which the FHAA barred this type of discrimination was simply to add
"familial status" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination in each of the
FHA's substantive prohibitions, including § 3604.88 Otherwise, Congress left
the language of all of § 3604's subsections-including that of §§ 3604(a) and
3604(b)-precisely the same. The fact that the FHAA did make some changes
in the FHA's substantive provisions (i.e., in § 3605) and that it "opened up" §
3604 by amending this section to include familial status discrimination suggests
that Congress approved of the existing understanding of §§ 3604(a) and
3604(b). 189 Therefore, to the extent thatjudicial interpretations of §§ 3604(a) and
to provide the FHA with "an effective enforcement system" in order to make the FHA's promise
of nondiscrimination "a reality." Id. at 13. The FHAA strengthened all three of the FHA's
enforcement techniques by: (1) eliminating the punitive damage cap, lengthening the statute of
limitations, and making attorney's fees awards easier to obtain in private litigation; (2) establishing
an expedited administrative complaint procedure that could result in injunctive relief, damages, and
civil penalties; and (3) authorizing the Justice Department to collect monetary damages for
aggrieved persons in its "pattern or practice" and "general public importance" cases. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3610-3614 (2000); see generally SCHWEMM, supra note 13, ch. 24-26.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000). For a description of the differences between the original
§ 3605 and the FHAA version, see SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 18:1.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(l)(A).
186. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
187. For other examples of FHA provisions that demonstrate a concern for protecting current
residents, see Short, supra note 81, at 213-14, 217-21 (discussing the FHA's § 3604(b) (defining
"dwelling" to include structures that are "occupied" as residences)), and 42 U.S.C. § 3617
(outlawing interference on account of one's "having exercised" a §§ 3604-3606 right); infra text
accompanying notes 194-95 (discussing the FHA's § 3604(f)(l)(B) and § 3604(f)(2)(B), both of
which outlaw discrimination because a person with a disability is "residing in" a dwelling); see also
42 U.S.C. § 3631 (provision, passed along with the FHA, making it a crime to use force because
a person has "occupied" a dwelling)).
188. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(e), 3605, 3606, 3617.
189. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware
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3604(b) (e.g., the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Southend)"9 had delineated how
these provisions applied to claims of discriminatory municipal services, the
FHAA may be taken to have tacitly approved those interpretations.
The FHAA's prohibition against disability discrimination was handled
somewhat differently. With respect to most of the FHA's substantive
prohibitions, "handicap," like "familial status," was simply added to the list of
FHA-prohibited bases of discrimination, 9' but this was not done in §§ 3604(a)
and 3604(b). As to the practices outlawed by these provisions, they were copied
almost verbatim in two new parts of the FHA-§§ 3604(f)(1) and
3604(f)(2)-that dealt exclusively with handicap discrimination.192
This was apparently done to make clear that the FHAA would not condemn
housing made available especially for people with disabilities (i.e., that the
statute does not authorize "reverse discrimination" suits against such housing by
non-handicapped persons).193 Thus, § § 3604(f)(1) and 3604(f)(2) only make their
identified practices unlawful if done "because of a handicap of-
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so
sold, rented or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter."'94
Among other things, the "residing in" language in part (B) of § 3604(f)(1) and
§ 3604(f)(2) shows that these provisions cover current residents as well as
homeseekers. 95
Two additional points are worth noting about § 3604(f)(2), the disability
counterpart to § 3604(b)'s prohibition of discriminatory terms, conditions,
of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
re-enacts a statute without change" (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8
(1975)); see also Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 117 (2002) (finding "tacit
congressional approval" of an interpretation of Title VH based on Congress's "being presumed to
have known of [the] settled judicial treatment" of that statute when it made other amendments to
that law); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (holding it appropriate to assume
that Congress knew of lower court decisions interpreting a statute and presuming that Congress
intended to carry this interpretation forward in a similarly worded statute).
190. See supra note 174 and accompanying text; supra note 180.
191. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c)-(e), 3605, 3606, 3617.
192. See id. § 3604(f)(1)-(2).
193. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 24-25 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2185-86 (describing § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) as prohibiting discrimination "against"
handicapped persons); Implementation of the FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988,54 Fed. Reg.
3232, 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (noting in HUD's commentary on its FHAA regulations that the statute
"does not prohibit the exclusion of non-handicapped persons from dwellings").
194. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The quoted language is from § 3604(f)(1); identical language is
used in § 3604(f)(2), except that the latter substitutes "that person" for "that buyer or renter" in
subparts (A) and (C).
195. See Short, supra note 81, at 216-17; see also infra note 201 and accompanying text and
infra note 204 para. 2.
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privileges, services, and facilities. First, the principal congressional report on §
3604(f)(2) gives some examples of the conduct it outlaws. This report states that
§ 3604(0(2)
would guarantee, for example, that an individual could not be
discriminatorily barred from access to recreation facilities, parking
privileges, cleaning and janitorial services and other facilities, uses of
the premises, benefits and privileges made available to other tenants,
residents, and owners. To the extent that terms, conditions, privileges,
services or facilities operate to discriminate against a person because of
a handicap, elimination of the discrimination would be required in order
to comply with the requirements of this subsection. 196
The examples in this commentary may help give meaning to the terms
"facilities," "privileges," and "services"in § 3604(b) and § 3604(f)(2), and they
also provide additional evidence that § 3604(f)(2) was intended to protect current
residents as well as homeseekers.
However, before we can extend this understanding to the similar provision
for other protected classes in § 3604(b), a second point about § 3604(f)(2) must
be noted. The prohibitory language used in § 3604(f)(2) is nearly identical to
that of § 3604(b), but the small difference may be important to the issue of
whether current residents are covered by § 3604(b). 97 The first phrase of §
3604(f)(2) and § 3604(b) are the same, outlawing discrimination "in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling." 198 However, the second
phrase in § 3604(f)(2) extends this prohibition to "services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling,"'99 whereas this second phrase in § 3604(b) reads
"services or facilities in connection therewith.' '200 The "in connection with such
dwelling" language in § 3604(0(2) clearly affirms that this provision protects
current residents as well as homeseekers, and post-FHAA decisions have so
held.20 ' However, the use of "therewith" in § 3604(b) has been interpreted by
196. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 23-24.
197. The prohibitory language used in § 3604(f)(1) is also not quite identical to that of its
counterpart, § 3604(a), see supra note 48, and SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 13:1, text accompanying
nn. 1-3, although the slight differences between these provisions do not seem relevant to the issue
of whether they cover claims by current residents.
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), (0(2) (2000).
199. Id. § 3604(0(2) (emphasis added).
200. See id. § 3604(b) (emphasis added).
201. See, e.g., Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 363-65 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding
§ 3604(0(2) claim by disabled tenant against his landlord based on disability harassment during
plaintiff's residency); Wilstein v. San Tropai Condo. Master Ass'n, No. 98 C 6211, 1999 WL
262145, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 1999) (upholding § 3604(0(2) claim by disabled owner of
condominium against his condominium association); Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, No. WMN-
98-2163, 1998 WL 1119864, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1998) (upholding § 3604(0(2) claim
challenging discrimination by governmental officials in providing parking and utility services); see
also Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting, in
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some courts to revert back to the "sale or rental" language in the first phrase as
opposed to that phrase's "of a dwelling" language, thus leading them to agree
with Halprin that § 3604(b) is limited to the "sale or rental" stage and does not
protect current residents.2°u
group home's challenge to municipality's decision concerning plaintiff's sewer rates based on §
3604(f)(2), that"[b]y its express terms, this section applies to 'the provision of services or facilities'
to a dwelling, such as sewer service"); Good Shepherd Manor Found. v. City of Momence, 323
F.3d 557,565 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting in dicta that City's cut-off of water supply to group home
for disabled persons would violate the FHA if it were motivated by discriminatory intent); Congdon
v. Strine, 854 F. Supp. 355, 360-62 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting for lack of proof tenants' claim under
§ 3604(f)(2) that landlord discriminated against them by poorly maintaining the building's
elevator).
This conclusion reflects the fact that the Congress that passed the 1988 FHAA was aware of
post-acquisition housing problems faced by disabled tenants. See, e.g., FairHousing Amendments
Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 558 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 240 (1988) (statement of Homer C. Floyd, Executive Director, Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission) (noting that "[o]nce housed, the handicapped may face additional
problems" and providing examples of difficulties encountered by disabled tenants).
As indicated by the Seventh Circuit's comment in the City of Momence case supra, §
3604(f)(2) of the FHA would appear to provide current residents with a basis for challenging
inferior municipal services based on disability discrimination. 323 F.3d at 565. In any event, such
discrimination also seems to be outlawed by Title H of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act
and, if the defendant receives federal financial assistance, by Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act. See, e.g., Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44-46 (2d Cir.
1997).
202. See Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL 370242, at *7-8 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 24, 2004), afftd, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005) (opining, in § 3604(b) claim alleging
discriminatory municipal services, that in order to determine whether this provision "extends
beyond the sale or rental of housing, it is necessary to decide whether the language 'in connection
with'[sic] refers to the 'sale or rental of a dwelling' or merely the 'dwelling' in general" and
adopting the former interpretation in deciding against plaintiffs' claim (citing Laramore v. Ill.
Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. I11. 1989)); King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass'n,
No. 04-2192-JWL, 2004 WL 2538379, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2004) (rejecting black resident's §
3604(b) claim against her condominium association for discriminatory treatment on the ground that
this provision's "in connection therewith" phrase plainly limits § 3604(b)'s scope "to
discrimination in connection with the sale or rental of housing"); Ross v. Midland Mgmt. Co., No.
02 C 8190, 2003 WL 21801023, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) (rejecting black resident's § 3604(b)
claim against her landlord for discriminatory services on the ground that this provision's "in
connection therewith" phrase limits § 3604(b)'s scope to "services in connection with the
acquisition of housing, not its maintenance" (citing Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs.
Corp., 929 F.2d 717, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Laramore, 722 F. Supp. at 452 (rejecting black
plaintiffs' § 3604(b) claim challenging governmental agency's decision to locate sports facility in
their neighborhood in part on the ground that this provision's "in connection with" phrase is more
naturally read to refer to "sale or rental" than to "a dwelling").
Other courts, however, have disagreed. See, e.g., Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't,
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Can this tiny difference between § 3604(f)(2) and § 3604(b) bear such
weight? It seems unlikely, given the total absence in the FHAA's legislative
history of any mention of this difference, much less any comment on its potential
significance. Furthermore, both the courts and HUD have opined that §
3604(b)'s outlawed practices are identical to those banned by § 3604(f)(2).2 °3
But the difference is there, and it presumably means something.2t 4
885 F.2d 1215, 1224 (4th Cir. 1989) (assuming that § 3604(b)'s second phrase bans discrimination
"in the provision of services 'in connection with a dwelling'); Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp.
2d 398, 416 (D. Md. 2005) (same); see also Edwards v. Media Borough Council, 430 F. Supp. 2d
445,453 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that "the statute is somewhat vague on the question of what 'the
provision of services or facilities' modifies"); Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005
WL 1065141, at *2-5 n.16 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (described infra note 342); Lopez v. City of
Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, at *7-9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (viewing
HUD's regulation in 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a) as interpreting "the 'in connection therewith' language
of § 3604(b) as referring to the 'sale or rental of a dwelling,' rather than the 'dwelling' in general,"
but nevertheless upholding § 3604(b) claim alleging discriminatory municipal services based, in
part, on interpreting that provision's "therewith" phase to cover services "associated with a
dwelling" based on this HUD regulation).
203. HUD's view is described infra note 228 and accompanying text. Court opinions include
Smith v. Pacific Properties & Development Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) ("statutory
language of § 3604(f)(2) ... replicates that of § 3604(b)"); Clifton Terrace, 929 F.2d at 719 (§
3604(f)(2) "extends the same protection to the handicapped" as § 3604(b) does to other protected
classes); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 971-76 (D. Neb. 2004) (relying on §
3604(f)(2) precedent to hold that § 3604(b) applies to current residents).
Even Judge Posner's opinion in Halprin did not make a distinction between § 3604(b) and §
3604(f)(2). See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327,329
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 2003) (a § 3604(f)(2)
case); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996) and Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th
Cir. 1993) (§ 3604(b) cases involving sexual harassment of tenants)) as among those decisions that
had recognized § 3604 claims by current residents, but dismissing all of these decisions as not
containing "a considered holding").
204. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006) (in
determining "whether Congress intended its different words to make a legal difference[, w]e
normally presume that, where words differ as they differ here, 'Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983)).
One possible explanation for why Congress felt the need to make § 3604(f)(2) explicit in
covering services and facilities connected to dwellings (as opposed to those connected only with
sales and rentals of dwellings) is that this provision-along with § 36040(f)(1)-is the target of §
3604(f)(3), which defines certain practices as "discrimination" for purposes of these earlier
subsections. Two of the practices identified in § 3604(f)(3)-required modifications in §
3604(f)(3)(A) and required accommodations in § 3604(0(3)(B)-are primarily directed against
landlords and other housing providers who are dealing with current residents. See, e.g., Wilstein,
1999 WL 262145, at *7-8 (upholding § 3604()(3) reasonable accommodation claim under §
3604()(2) by disabled owner of condominium against his condominium association); 24 C.F.R.
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2. The 1989 HUD Regulations.-As mandated by the 1988 FHAA, °5 HUD
promptly published a lengthy set of FHA regulations that became effective on
March 12, 1989.206 These regulations are accorded Chevron deference. 217 This
means that, unless "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue"
(i.e., the statute "unambiguously expressed the intent of Congress"), 208 courts are
to follow the HUD regulations so long as they are a "permissible" or
"reasonable" construction of the FHA (i.e., they "are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute"). 2°9
HUD's FHA regulations deal explicitly with § 3604's coverage of discriminatory
municipal services and also provide additional indications that § 3604(b) applies
to current residents.
The regulations interpreting § 3604 are set forth in 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50-.85,
with § 100.50 providing an overview; 210 § 100.60 providing examples of conduct
prohibited by § 3604(a);211 § 100.65 providing examples of § 3604(b)-prohibited
conduct; 212 § 100.70 providing examples of "other prohibited sales and rental
conduct"; 2 3 and succeeding provisions providing examples of conduct prohibited
by other subsections of § 3604.214 These regulations, like § 3604 itself, simply
describe the conduct prohibited, without identifying who might be appropriate
defendants, thereby implying that any person or entity who engages in such FHA-
prohibited conduct may be held liable. 15
§ 100.203(c) ex. 1 (2007) (illustrating a violation of § 3604(f)(3)(A)'s reasonable modifications
requirement with an example involving a current tenant's request to his landlord). The idea
suggested here is that, as the substantive prohibition that is target of these requirements, §
3604(f)(l)-(2) must be especially carefully written to make clear it covers current residents. See
generally Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63-67 (relying on the purpose of provisions involved
in determining whether Congress's use of different language in these provisions should make a legal
difference).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614a (2000).
206. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (Jan. 23,
1989).
207. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984);
see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003) (relying on HUD regulation to interpret the
FHA). For a list of decisions that have accorded deference to HUD's FHA regulations, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 7:5 n.17.
208. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
209. Id. at 843-45.
210. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.50 (2007).
211. Seeid. § 100.60.
212. See id. § 100.65.
213. See id. § 100.70.
214. See id. § 100.75 (dealing with § 3604(c)); § 100.80 (dealing with § 3604(d)); and §
100.85 (dealing with § 3604(e)).
215. See NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287,298 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that
§ 3604 is written "in the passive voice-banning an outcome while not saying who the actor is, or
how such actors bring about the forbidden consequence"); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280,
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In light of Southend and the few other cases that had dealt with municipal
services prior to these regulations, 216 one might have expected this matter to be
dealt with in § 100.65, the regulation specifically dealing with § 3604(b).
Indeed, this regulation does include an example of prohibited conduct by
providers of housing-related services that seems potentially applicable to
municipalities: "Limiting the use of privileges, services or facilities associated
with a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
national origin."2" 7  According to HUD's commentary, this and the other
examples indicate that "the coverage of [§ 3604(b)] extends beyond restrictions
or differences in a lease or sales contract [to outlaw discriminatory] denials of,
or limitations on the use of privileges, services or facilities, relating to the sale
or rental of a dwelling. 2 8
However, the explicit reference to municipal services in the regulations does
not appear in § 100.65, but in § 100.70, which deals with "other prohibited sales
and rental conduct." Specifically, § 100.70(d)(4) identifies as a prohibited
activity: "Refusing to provide municipal services or property or hazard insurance
for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. 219
This provision appears as the last of four examples of "[p]rohibited activities
285-86 (noting that the FHA "focuses on prohibited acts" and "says nothing about [defendants']
vicarious liability").
216. See supra notes 168, 174 and accompanying text (discussing, respectively, Vercher,
Mackey, and Southend); see also infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Harlan's dissent in Sullivan).
217. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4). For a pre-Cox decision interpreting this regulation to apply to
discriminatory municipal services, see Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL
2026804, at *7-9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004).
Another possibly relevant example of prohibited conduct in HUD's § 3604(b) regulation is:
"Failing or delaying maintenance or repairs of sale or rental dwellings because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2).
"Maintenance or repairs" here could conceivably cover, for example, a municipality's program of
road improvements, but the HUD example is limited to maintenance and repairs that are "of sale
or rental dwellings," implying that the example is directed only against housing providers. This
latter phrase is also odd in that it suggests exclusion of some "dwellings" (i.e., those not
encompassed by the phrase "sale or rental dwellings"). See id. In short, there are sufficient
ambiguities in this latter example to conclude that it may not be particularly useful to support claims
of discriminatory municipal services by current residents.
218. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3239
(Jan. 23, 1989).
219. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4). For cases referring to this regulation's coverage of municipal
services discrimination, see supra note 50 and infra note 224. Cases according Chevron deference
to this regulation's coverage of insurance discrimination include Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1356-60 (6th Cir. 1995); NAACP v. American Family Mutual Insurance
Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1992); Strange v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 867 F.
Supp. 1209, 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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relating to dwellings under paragraph (b) of this section," which outlaws any
discriminatory conduct "relating to the provision of housing or of services and
facilities in connection therewith that otherwise makes unavailable or denies
dwellings to persons. 22°  In other words, the regulation that outlaws
discriminatory municipal services does so as an example of a more general
prohibitive regulation whose language combines the "services and facilities"
wording of § 3604(b) with the "otherwise make unavailable or deny" phrase in
§ 3604(a).
By so placing the prohibition against discriminatory municipal services,
HUD has indicated that this practice might violate § 3604(a) as well as §
3604(b). HUD's commentary on this regulation notes how discriminatory
municipal services might violate § 3604(a)' s "make unavailable" provision-that
is, that "discrimination in the provision of those services and facilities which are
prerequisites to obtaining dwellings, including discriminatory refusals to provide
municipal services ... render dwellings unavailable" in violation of the Fair
Housing Act.22' Thus, for example, in cases like Kennedy Park and United Farm
Workers where municipalities blocked proposed developments by denying them
water or sewer service for racial reasons,222 housing would be made unavailable
in violation of § 3604(a).
223
On the other hand, a claim based on a municipality's provision of inferior
services to homeowners in a minority neighborhood would presumably be more
appropriate under § 3604(b), with a § 3604(a) claim arising in this situation only
if the discrimination became so egregious that the plaintiffs' homes were made
"unavailable." In the former situation-the one presented in Cox-the HUD
example's language seems directly on point; that is, it identifies prohibited action
as "providing such [municipal] services . . . differently because of race."224
However, the context of this example confuses the matter, because the example
is given to illustrate the principle that such discriminatory action is outlawed if
it relates "to the provision.., of services ... in connection [with housing] that
220. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b).
221. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 3232,3240
(Jan. 23, 1989). Similarly, HUD's earlier commentary on this regulation noted that "discrimination
in the provision of those services and facilities which are prerequisites to obtaining dwellings,
including discriminatory refusals to provide municipal services .... has been interpreted by the
Department and by courts to render dwellings unavailable under the 'otherwise make unavailable'
[part of § 3604(a)] in the Fair Housing Act." Fair Housing; Implementation of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 44992, 44997 (Nov. 7, 1988).
222. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
223. For an example of a case decided after the 1989 HUD regulations took effect, see
Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 958-60 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), subsequent
decision, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (described infra note 232).
224. See supra text accompanying note 219. For a pre-Cox decision relying on this regulation
to uphold a § 3604(b) claim by homeowners in a minority neighborhood who alleged discrimination
in various municipal services, see Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL
2026804, at *7-9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004).
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otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to persons."225 In other words,
providing discriminatory municipal services is an FHA violation, but perhaps
only if it makes housing unavailable. If this is so, then HUD's example dealing
with discriminatory municipal service does not provide guidance with respect to
a Cox-type case brought by current homeowners.226
One final comment about the HUD regulations and their relevance to the
issues discussed in this Article is that these regulations reflect HUD's view that
the practices outlawed by § 3604(b) are identical to those banned by §
3604(f)(2). The latter, as we have seen, protects current residents as well as
homeseekers. 27 HUD's belief that § 3604(b)'s coverage is co-equal with §
3604(f)(2)'s is reflected in the fact that its regulation interpreting § 3604(b) also
deals with the handicap prohibitions of § 3604(f)(2).228 Indeed, HUD's other
regulations dealing with handicap-based discrimination do not address the
coverage of § 3604(f)(2) at all, other than to paraphrase the text of this
provision. 229 Further, evidence of HUD's belief that § 3604(b) and § 3604(f)(2)
outlaw identical practices appears in its commentary on the regulation dealing
with these provisions, which states that, subject to reasonable health-and-safety
rules, this regulation requires "full access of handicapped persons and children
to all facilities provided in connection with dwellings; 2 30 that is, the protection
against "facilities" discrimination accorded families with children in § 3604(b)
is the same as its counterpart for persons with disabilities in § 3604(f)(2).
3. Post-Regulation Cases.-Most FHA-based municipal services cases
decided after HUD's 1989 regulations took effect have been brought by current
homeowners. Courts in these cases have generally not been receptive to §
3604(a)-"make unavailable" claims by such plaintiffs.23' The decisions have thus
225. See supra text accompanying note 220.
226. Despite this ambiguity, courts have relied on this regulation to hold that § 3604(b) bars
home insurance discrimination in the context of claims brought by current, as well as would-be,
homeowners. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1354, 1356-60 (6th
Cir. 1995); Franklin v. Allstate Corp., No. C-06-1909 MMC, 2007 WL 1991516, at *1-2, *6-7
(N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007).
227. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
228. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (2007); see also supra note 217 and accompanying text (quoting
examples of conduct prohibited by § 3604(b) in 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) as including those based on
handicap as well as those based on the six protected classes covered by § 3604(b)).
229. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.200-.205. The paraphrasing of § 3604(f)(2) occurs in 24 C.F.R. §
100.202(b), which includes no examples of prohibited behavior, in contrast to the other parts of the
handicap-based regulations, which often provide examples and deal in detail with, inter alia,
prohibited inquiries of applicants, reasonable modifications and accommodations for disabled
persons, and the FHAA's design-and-construction requirements. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)-.205.
230. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3236
(Jan. 23, 1989).
231. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir.
1999) (dismissing, based on Southend and other cases, black homeowners' § 3604(a) claim
challenging the siting of a new highway near their neighborhood on the ground that no one was
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agreed with Southend that this provision is limited to situations where municipal
action blocks the development of housing 32 or is so disruptive of current
residents' habitability that their housing is effectively made unavailable to
them.
233
evicted or denied housing by this decision, and it therefore did not make housing unavailable under
§ 3604(a)); Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2004) (dismissing, based on Southend, black homeowners' § 3604(a) claim of
discrimination in various municipal services); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500-02 (D.N.J. 2003) (dismissing, based on Southend and other cases,
§ 3604(a) claim by residents of minority neighborhood against governmental agency whose
permitting of a nearby cement plant had only an indirect effect on availability of housing in
plaintiffs' neighborhood); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3898-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834,
at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (rejecting, based on Southend, black homeowners' § 3604(a)
claim alleging discrimination in various municipal services); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F.
Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting, based on Southend, black homeowners' § 3604(a)
claim that defendants terminated police protection of plaintiffs' home because of their race); see
also Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting
§ 3604(a) claim by current residents based on municipality's removal of Jewish religious symbols
from its utility poles on the ground that this action did not make housing "unavailable" to the
plaintiffs and that, while it may have made "their living in the Borough less desirable," § 3604(a)
could not be stretched "to encompass actions that both (1) do not actually make it more difficult (as
opposed to less desirable) to obtain housing and (2) do not directly regulate or zone housing or
activities within the home"); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (1 1th Cir.
1994) (noting, while upholding § 3604(a) claim here, that this provision requires plaintiffs to
"allege unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing"); Clifton
Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting,
based on Southend, § 3604(a) claim of discriminatory services on behalf of black apartment
residents on the ground that this provision-while perhaps extending to sewer hook-ups and certain
other "essential services relating to a dwelling .. . [that] might result in the denial of
housing"--cannot reach beyond issues of housing availability to those of habitability); Edwards
v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1221-24 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of
§ 3604(a) claim that County inappropriately approved substandard housing for migrant farm
workers in part on the ground that such approval did not make any housing "unavailable").
232. A modem example of such a case is Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950,
958-60 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), subsequent decision, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir. 2004), which upheld
FHA claims-citing §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), 3604(c), and 3617-by a black lot owner who alleged
that municipal officials denied water service to his planned home because of his race. See also
McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, No. 86-1674, 1987 WL 44775, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 1987)
(described supra note 180).
233. See, e.g., 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673,684-
85 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant-municipality's argument that, absent its actual closing of
Hispanics' apartment buildings, its posting of "closure" notices on those buildings was insufficient
to violate tenants' § 3604(a) rights, because "[tielling the tenants either that their 'occupancy...
is ... prohibited' or that they must 'seek alternative housing' certainly qualifies as making the
buildings 'unavailable' under the FHA"); cf. United Farm Bureau Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro.
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On the other hand, the years following publication of the HUD regulations
produced many decisions endorsing § 3604(b) claims by current residents.234
This body of cases includes only a handful that cited the HUD regulation,235 but
Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1008, 1014, 1014 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding resident's
claim that insurance company's refusal to renew his homeowner's policy on racial grounds violates
the FHA's § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) along with similarly worded state and local fair housing
provisions and determining that the goal of these laws is to eliminate "discrimination in the
acquisition, and one must presume retention, of real property and housing" and that nonrenewal of
a home insurance policy "undoubtedly could make owning and retaining real property
unavailable"); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20-22 (D.D.C. 2000)
(upholding resident's predatory lending claim based on § 3604(a) on the ground that "predatory
practices.., can make housing unavailable by putting borrowers at risk of losing the property
which secures their loans").
234. See, e.g., Lopez, 2004 WL 2026804, at *6-9 (denying summary judgment for defendants
in § 3604(b) claim by homeowners in black neighborhood who alleged discrimination in various
municipal services); Middlebrook, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (upholding, based on the "clear language
of § 3604(b) and § 3617," black property owner's FHA claim alleging that municipal officials
denied water service to plaintiff's planned home because of his race); Miller, 2002 WL 230834, at
*14 (denying summary judgment for defendants in § 3604(b) claim alleging discrimination in
various municipal services); Campbell, 815 F. Supp. at 1143-44 (upholding black homeowners'
§ 3604(b) claim of discrimination in the provision of police protection and, as a result, also their
§ 3617 claim); see also 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants'Ass'n, 444 F.3d at 682-85 (upholding claim
based on both § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) alleging that municipality discriminated against Hispanic-
occupied apartment buildings in its enforcement of housing code violations); Franks v. Ross, 313
F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing § 3604(b) as the FHA's relevant provision in case brought by
residents of black town claiming that County sited undesirable landfill near it based on race); Jersey
Heights Neighborhood Ass'n, 174 F.3d at 193 (rejecting the particular § 3604(b) claim presented,
but noting that this provision does require "'such things as garbage collection and other services
of the kind usually provided by municipalities"' (quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d
419, 424 (9th Cir. 1989)); Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 720 (suggesting, without deciding,
that § 3604(b) covers utilities and other "sole source" providers of services essential to a dwelling's
habitability who, although not themselves housing providers, "otherwise control the provision of
housing services and facilities"); Edwards, 885 F.2d at 1224-25 (assuming that the defendant's
inspection and permit system for approving housing for migrant farm workers would fall within the
scope of § 3604(b), but dismissing claim because plaintiffs failed to allege that different services
were being accorded housing for whites); S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 499, 502-03 (rejecting the
particular § 3604(b) claim presented, but noting that this provision would cover governmental units
that provide "specific residential services [including those] responsible for door-to-door
ministrations such as ... police departments [and] fire departments"); Laramore v. Ill. Sports
Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (rejecting the particular § 3604(b) claim
presented, but noting that this provision may cover police and fire protection and garbage
collection).
235. See, e.g., Shaikh v. City of Chi., 341 F.3d 627,631-32 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing the
HUD regulation in support of the proposition that withholding police or fire protection would be
covered by the FHA); Lopez, 2004 WL 2026804, at *7-9 (described supra note 202 2); see also
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they, along with this regulation, seemed to settle the basic issue of the FHA's
coverage of discriminatory municipal services.236
Still, a number of cases decided after publication of the 1989 HUD
regulations resisted the idea that § 3604(b) could be extended to all governmental
activities that might have a negative impact on the use and enjoyment of housing.
These included:
-a 1999 Fourth Circuit decision rejecting a § 3604(b) claim by black
homeowners challenging the siting of a new highway near their
neighborhood on the ground that the defendants' decision was not a
"housing or housing related service" under this provision;
2 37
-a 2003 district court decision rejecting a § 3604(b) claim by residents
of a black neighborhood against a governmental environmental
protection agency that permitted operation of a near-by cement plant on
the ground that this defendant did not provide "a service.., in a manner
contemplated by the Fair Housing Act" as distinguished from
governmental units "responsible for door-to-door ministrations such as
those provided by police departments, fire departments, or other
municipal units";238 and,
-a 1989 district court decision rejecting a § 3604(b) claim by area
residents challenging a governmental agency's decision to locate a sports
stadium in their neighborhood on the ground that, while § 3604(b) might
cover police and fire protection and garbage collection, it "cannot be
extended to a decision such as the selection of a stadium site. ' '239
In addition, dicta in a 1991 D.C. Circuit decision expressed skepticism about
whether all discriminatory municipal services that "have an impact on the use
and enjoyment of residential property rights" would be redressable under §
3604(b).24°
Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 719-20 (described infra note 240).
236. The one contrary decision seems to be NeighborhoodAction Coalition v. City of Canton,
882 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1989), which affirmed dismissal of an FHA claim based on defendant's
providing inferior police protection to a minority neighborhood. Id. at 1017. The opinion,
however, upheld the plaintiffs' equal protection and Title VI claims and did not explicitly discuss
the reason for rejecting the FHA claim. Id.
237. Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n, 174 F.3d at 193. The Jersey Heights opinion also
commented that § 3604(b) does "not extend to every activity having any conceivable effect on
neighborhood residents.... The Fair Housing Act does not grant to residents the right to have
highways sited where they please.... We do not think the drafters of the Fair Housing Act ever
contemplated such a reading." Id. at 193-94.
238. S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 499, 502-03.
239. Laramore, 722 F. Supp. at 452.
240. Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 720 (rejecting § 3604(b) claim by apartment owner
against elevator company that allegedly refused to repair the elevators in plaintiffs building
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To summarize, in the fifteen years after the FHAA's enactment and the 1989
HUD regulations, three propositions seem to have become well established:
-First, the FHA through § 3604(a) provides a remedy for
discriminatory municipal services, but only where such discrimination
has the effect of making housing unavailable (e.g., where a municipality
totally blocks development of new housing or renders current housing
virtually uninhabitable);
-Second, § 3604(b) outlaws the discriminatory provision of basic,
housing-related municipal services, such as police and fire protection
and garbage collection; and,
-Third, determining whether certain other government acts qualify as
"services" or negatively impact the "privileges" covered by § 3604(b)
requires a case-by-case analysis, with the answer probably being "No"
if the challenged act involves such one-time decisions as the siting of a
highway, factory, or other residentially-disruptive use in or near the
plaintiffs' neighborhood.
As we have seen, however, the appellate decisions of Halprin in 2004 and
Cox in 2005 undercut the second of these well-established propositions by
holding that current residents could not invoke § 3604.241 This limited view of
§ 3604(b) was also espoused in a few district court opinions that preceded
Halprin242 and has been the subject of a split among district judges outside the
Seventh and Fifth Circuits after Halprin and Cox.
243
because of the residents' race on the ground that § 3604(b) was intended to protect residents with
discriminatory service claims against housing providers and could not generally be invoked by
housing providers against third parties who offer services to them). The Clifton Terrace opinion,
which also rejected the plaintiff's § 3604(a) claim, is further described supra notes 231 and 234 and
infra text accompanying notes 355-65.
241. See supra Parts I.B (Halprin) and I.C (Cox).
242. See sources cited supra note 62.
243. Decisions adopting the Halprin-Cox position include Steele v. City of Port Wentworth,
Civ. A. No. CV405-135, 2008 WL 717813 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2008) (described infra note 398);
Miller v. City of Knoxville, No. 3:03-CV-574, 2006 WL 2506229, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29,2006)
(stating "that the [FHA] does not apply to municipalities in failing to enforce codes, as such action
goes to the habitability of a dwelling, not the availability" (citing Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d
734 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Roy v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Walton County, Florida, No.
3:06cv95/MCR/EMT, 2007 WL 3345352, at *12 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2007) (rejecting § 3604(b)
claim based on County's denial of zoning approval for plaintiffs' proposed housing development
in part because the delays and impediments imposed by the defendants "were not connected with
the sale of the property to the plaintiffs and only affected their use of property previously
purchased").
Decisions upholding § 3604(b) claims by homeowners and other current residents include
Beard v. Worldwide Mortgage Corp., 354 F. Supp. 2d 789, 808-09 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); United
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As indicated in the previous discussion of Halprin, the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in that case is flawed, 2" but the validity of its basic conclusion denying
§ 3604 protection to current residents-and of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cox
to endorse this conclusion-turns mainly on the specific language used in
subsections (a) and (b) of § 3604. We turn next to an examination of that
language.
I. KEY FHA PROVISIONS AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Overview
The FHA's first section boldly declares that it "is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout
the United States. 2 45 After two sections dealing with definitions, effective dates,
and exemptions, the fourth section contains the FHA's main substantive
prohibitions. As we have seen, the first two subsections of this provision-§
3604(a) and § 3604(b)-have been the basis for most FHA claims of
discriminatory municipal services.246 Additional discriminatory practices are
outlawed in the other subsections of § 3604 and in §§ 3605-3606.247 Finally, §
3617, which is also occasionally relied on in discriminatory municipal services
cases, 248 prohibits interference "with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of,
States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970,975-78 (D. Neb. 2004); North Dakota Fair Housing Council,
Inc. v. Allen, 319 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980-981 (D.N.D. 2004); see also United States v. Matusoff
Rental Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745, 758 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that the defendant violated
§ 3604(b) in part because it refused to perform needed maintenance on the apartment of a mixed-
race couple); Edwards v. Media Borough Council, 430 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(recognizing that § 3604(b) may cover police and fire protection, garbage collection, and similar
municipal services, but rejecting the present claim based on defendant's denial of a zoning variance
for plaintiff's property on the ground that this is instead "a discretionary decision comparable to
administering city-owned properties or deciding where to site a highway, conduct that is not
covered under § 3604(b)"); Savanna Club Worship Service, Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners'
Ass'n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228-31 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (described infra note 349).
244. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
246. The texts of subsections (a) and (b) of § 3604 are set forth in supra notes 48 and 49
respectively.
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (outlawing discriminatory advertisements, notices, and
statements); § 3604(d) (outlawing discriminatory misrepresentations of availability); § 3604(e)
(outlawing "blockbusting"); § 3605 (outlawing discrimination in home financing and certain other
real estate related transactions); and § 3606 (outlawing discrimination in brokerage services).
248. See, e.g., Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d
1207, 1210 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984) (described supra note 175); Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341
F. Supp. 2d 960 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), subsequent decision, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir. 2004)
(described supra note 232); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (described supra note 234); Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423,424 (M.D.
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or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or
protected by [§§ 3603-3606]." 249 The relevant substantive prohibitions in §
3604(a), § 3604(b), and § 3617 have remained the same since the FHA was
enacted in 1968.250
The language used in these substantive provisions evolved as the FHA was
being considered by Congress beginning in 1966. The rest of Part III describes
this evolution, which provides some insight into the meaning of the phrases used
and thus some perspective for answering the two questions at the heart of this
Article: (1) May the prohibitions set forth in § 3604-and particularly in §
3604(b)-be invoked by current residents to challenge discrimination by local
municipalities? and (2) Do the "services" and "privileges" mentioned in §
3604(b) cover municipal services? With respect to both questions, the FHA's
key language originated in the first fair housing bill proposed by President
Johnson in 1966, although the context, and therefore the possible interpretation,
of this language did change somewhat in subsequent versions of the bills that
became the FHA.
B. Legislative History of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b)
The legislative history of the 1968 FHA has been recounted a number of
times,251 and its key features should be familiar to this audience. The FHA was
passed after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led to riots in
Washington, D.C., and other cities, whose counterparts in 1966 and 1967 had
prompted a presidential commission that called for a national open housing
law.
252
Due to the haste that characterized passage of the FHA in 1968, its legislative
history produced little useful material concerning the proper interpretation of its
substantive prohibitions. No committee report was ever issued on the bill that
became the FHA, and the hearings that were held on prior proposals generally
dealt with the overall need for a fair housing law to allow blacks to escape urban
ghettos and with Congress's power to enact such a law.253 Even the 1968 floor
debates, to the extent they dealt with coverage issues, focused mainly on the
statute's exemptions and who would be proper defendants, rather than on the
meaning of the phrases used in § 3604(a), § 3604(b), and the other substantive
Pa. 1978) (described supra note 168).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
250. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. Furthermore, all of these prohibitions are, and
have been for many years, mirrored in scores of state and local fair housing laws. See supra note
28.
251. See, e.g., Jean Eberhart Dubofksy, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing
Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 197-206 (2001).
252. See REPORT OFTHE NATIONALADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVILDISORDERS 8-13 (1968).
253. See generally hearings cited infra notes 261 and 278.
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prohibitions.254 Thus, the proper interpretation of these provisions---even more
so than with most legislation-must be derived almost exclusively from the
words of the statute, unaided by legislative history.
255
Five distinct versions of the bill that eventually became the FHA were
considered by Congress, beginning with the Johnson Administration's initial
proposal in early 1966.256 In all five versions, the language of what became §
3604(a) and § 3604(b) remained virtually unchanged.257 Thus, the key language
254. For example, an analysis of Senator Dirksen's late proposal, see infra note 264 and
accompanying text, that was prepared by the Justice Department and introduced on the Senate floor,
simply paraphrased the bill's various prohibitions, including those that became § 3604(a) and §
3604(b), without providing any additional explanation of their specific meaning. See 114 CONG.
REc. 4907 (1968). Similarly, when the Senate-passed version reached the House floor, Judiciary
Committee Chairman Cellar offered a comparison of this bill to the 1966 House-passed version,
see infra note 260 and accompanying text, that did not describe the substantive prohibitions other
than to say that the House-passed version "prohibited almost the exact same type of conduct with
respect to housing discrimination" as did the Senate bill. See id. at 9560-61. Later in the House
floor debates, Republican Leader Gerald Ford introduced a memorandum prepared by the staff of
the House Judiciary Committee that did point out a number of differences between these two
versions, but none of these dealt with the prohibitions in § 3604(a) and § 3604(b), as to which the
memorandum provided no description other than to say that they were the equivalent of the House-
passed version's § 403(a)(1) and § 403(a)(2). See id. at 9611-13. Thus, for example, Professor
Oliveri has determined: 'There [is] no discussion anywhere in [the FHA's] legislative history about
how to interpret the language of § 3604(b).... [There is] [n]o specific discussion [about] whether
... the FHA [should be construed to apply] to post-acquisition housing." Oliveri, supra note 82,
at 27.
255. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (relying on the "plain
language" to interpret a Title VII provision and remarking that "in all cases involving statutory
construction, 'our starting point must be the language employed by Congress,' and we assume 'that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used"' (citations
omitted)).
256. The Johnson Administration's proposal was embodied in identical bills, S. 3296 and H.R.
14765, 89th Cong. (1966). A copy of S. 3296 is printed at 112 CONG. REc. 9394-98 (1966), with
the fair housing title appearing at 9396-97.
257. The provision that became § 3617, see supra note 65 and text accompanying note 249,
also is similar to the one included in the Johnson Administration's initial proposal. See, e.g., 114
CONG. REC. 9612 (1968) (describing the 1968 Senate-passed version of § 3617 that was ultimately
enacted as "comparable" to the 1966 House-passed version of this provision, which was identical
to the Johnson Administration's initial version, in a memorandum prepared late in the FHA's
legislative history by the staff of the House Judiciary Committee).
As first proposed by the Johnson Administration in 1966, the FHA's § 3617-predecessor
provided:
No person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or interfere with any person in the exercise
or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right
granted by section 403 or 404.
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of these provisions traces back to the Johnson Administration's initial proposal,
which made it unlawful for homeowners, real estate brokers, and certain other
categories of persons:
(a) To refuse to sell, rent, or lease, refuse to negotiate for the sale,
rental, or lease of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale, rental, or lease of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color,
religion, or national origin.25
Other than the inclusion of the emphasized "lease" phrases, this is the same
language that was ultimately adopted as § 3604(a) and § 3604(b).259
In response to the Administration's proposal, the House passed a fair housing
bill later in 1966 with this identical language, albeit applying the language to a
narrower group of potential defendants,26 but this bill died in the Senate. In
1967, Senator Mondale proposed a fair housing bill,261 which generally tracked
See 112 CONG. REC. 9397 (1966) (sec. 405). Senator Mondale's 1967 version, consistent with its
general approach, changed the introductory phrase to simply declaring these activities unlawful and
also changed the order of the verbs (to "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with") and inserted
"or protected" between "granted" and "by" in the final phrase. See Fair Housing Act of 1967:
Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs
of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. (1967) [hereinafter 1967Banking Hearings)
(setting forth sec. 7 of Senator Mondale's bill). Substantively, this version was adopted verbatim
in Senator Dirksen's version. See 114 CONG. REc. 4573 (1968) (sec. 217). The Dirksen version,
which ultimately was enacted, did change the placement of this provision to the end of the statute
and therefore made it not subject to the enforcement provisions governing the FHA's other
substantive prohibitions, but instead provided a new concluding sentence, stating: "This section
may be enforced by appropriate civil action." 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (Supp. V 1969) (amended 1988).
The 1988 FHAA reversed this last change, making a § 3617 violation "a discriminatory housing
practice" that, like those in §§ 3604-3606, may be enforced through the FHA' s regular enforcement
procedures. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2000).
258. See 112 CONG. REc. 9397 (1966) (emphasis added).
259. See supra notes 48-49.
260. See 112 CONG. REc. 18,739-40 (1966) (reporting passage of the bill); infra note 268
2 (describing narrower group of potential defendants). The House-passed version included a
number of other changes to the Administration's proposal, none of which is relevant to the meaning
of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b). These changes are described in Schwemm, supra note 251, at 201-02
nn.56-59.
261. Senator Mondale's bill (S. 1358) was the subject of hearings by a subcommittee of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee. See 1967 Banking Hearings, supra note 257. S. 1358,
which is printed in id. at 438-59, was identical to the fair housing title of a civil rights bill proposed
by the Johnson Administration in 1967 (S. 1026 and H.R. 5700), which was the subject of hearings
by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S.
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the House-passed version, but deleted the "or lease" phrase from these two
provisions and thus contained the exact language that ultimately became §
3604(a) and § 3604(b).262 This same language was also included in the Mondale-
Brooke proposal of early 1968263 and in Senator Dirksen's compromise proposal
later that year,2" which, with a few minor floor amendments,265 eventually
became the FHA.266
Although the wording of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) changed little throughout
this two-year process, two other provisions relevant to the meaning of these
subsections did undergo important changes. The most significant was that the
early versions limited those covered by these prohibitions to certain specified
entities, following the approach of Title VII, the employment discrimination law
passed in 1964.267 Thus, in both the initial Johnson Administration proposal and
the 1966 House-passed version, only those directly involved in selling or renting
1462, H.R. 2516 and H.R. 10805 (Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967), 90th Cong. (1967)
[hereinafter 1967 Judiciary Hearings]. Apart from these hearings, no further action was taken on
these bills in 1967.
262. For a description ofthe changes made by Senator Mondale's 1967 bill to the 1966 House-
passed version, see Schwemm, supra note 25 1, at 202-03 nn.60-63 and accompanying text. Senator
Mondale's deletion of "lease" from the key substantive provisions, thus limiting these prohibitions
to "sales" and "rentals," was accompanied by adding a definition of "to rent" that included "to
lease, to sublease, to let and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not
owned by the occupant," which ultimately was enacted as § 3602(d). Thus, deleting "lease" from
the substantive prohibitions served only to simplify the phrasing of these provisions, without
narrowing their coverage.
263. The Mondale-Brooke proposal took the form of an amendment offered to another civil
rights bill that had been passed by the House without a fair housing title and was then pending on
the Senate floor. See 114 CONG. REc. 2270-72 (proposal printed), 2279 (amendment formally
offered by Sen. Mondale) (1968). The Mondale-Brooke proposal was identical to Senator
Mondale's 1967 bill in all key respects, save one: it added the House-passed version of the "Mrs.
Murphy" exemption at the end of its main substantive section. See 114 CONG. REC. 2270 (1968)
(§ 4(f)).
264. The Dirksen proposal is printed at 114 CONG. REc. 4570-73 (1968). The changes made
by this proposal to the Mondale-Brooke version, none of which related to the language that became
§ 3604(a) and § 3604(b), are described in Schwemm, supra note 251, 204-05 nn.67-74 and
accompanying text.
265. For a description of these amendments, none of which related to the substantive scope
of what became § 3604(a) and § 3604(b), see Schwemm, supra note 251, at 205 n.76.
266. As so amended, the Dirksen proposal was passed by the Senate on March 11, 1968. See
114 CONG. REc. 5992 (1968). Shortly after Dr. King's assassination, the House voted to accept the
Senate-passed version. See id. at 9620-21. The next day, April 11, President Johnson signed the
bill into law. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Act, PUBUC PAPERS
OFTHE PRESIDENTS OFTHE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON: 1968-69, at 509-10 (1970).
267. Title VII's prohibitions are limited to employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and training programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d), 2000e-3(a) (2000).
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housing were to be covered by the prohibitions of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b).26 s
Therefore, had either of these versions passed, local governments would not have
been included as potential defendants, except to the extent they were involved in
selling, renting, or managing housing.269
Beginning with Senator Mondale's 1967 proposal, the lead-in to what
became § 3604 was changed by deleting these lists of potential defendants and
simply declaring that "[iut shall be unlawful" to engage in the practices set forth
in this provision's subsections. This version was ultimately enacted, with the
result that § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) have been read to cover all persons and
entities, including municipalities, that violate these provisions.27° However,
because Senator Mondale's version did not significantly change the substantive
phrases used in subsections (a) and (b), these phrases continued to owe their
origin to drafters who had in mind only covering persons engaged in the sale,
rental, or management of housing.
The second noteworthy change occurred in the FHA's introductory section
defining the law's policy. The initial version of this section set forth in the
Johnson Administration's 1966 proposal provided: "It is the policy of the United
States to prevent, and the right of every person to be protected against,
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin in the
purchase, rental, lease, financing, use and occupancy of housing throughout the
268. In the Johnson Administration's proposed bill, the introduction to the substantive
provision containing these subsections provided:
It shall be unlawful for the owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee, or manager of or other
person having the authority to sell, rent, lease, or manage, a dwelling, or for any
person who is a real estate broker or salesman, or employee or agent of a real estate
broker or salesman-
112 CONG. REc. 9397(1966) (emphasis added to show language ultimately deleted in the FHA).
In the House-passed version, this lead-in list of covered entities was narrowed to apply only
to real estate professionals and others in the housing business, thereby excluding homeowners and
other non-professionals, as follows:
It shall be unlawfulfor any person who is a real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or
employee or agent of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or any other person
in the business of building, developing, selling, renting, or leasing dwellings, or any
employee or agent of any such person-
See 112 CONG. REc. 18,112 (1966) (emphasis added to show language ultimately deleted in the
FHA).
269. A noteworthy feature of the list of potential defendants in the Johnson Administration's
proposed bill is that it included "manager[s]" and those who have "the authority to... manage"
dwellings, see supra note 268 1, thereby indicating coverage of discrimination directed against
residents after they obtained their housing through a sale or rental agreement. Although the House-
passed version deleted this reference to managers and otherwise narrowed the scope of this list, see
id. 2, the fact remains that the Administration's version was the one that first proposed the
operative language of what became § 3604(a) and § 3604(b), indicating that the drafters of these
provisions did intend them to cover a time period extending beyond when housing is first acquired.
270. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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Nation."27' The significant point here is that the discrimination declared to be
addressed by this statute was not limited to the purchase, rental, lease, and
financing of housing, but also extended to discrimination in its "use and
occupancy." Had this version survived, it would have provided a strong
indication that the protections of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) were intended to cover
current residents of housing and not just those seeking to buy or rent, as Halprin
and Cox later concluded.2
But this version did not survive. It was part of the 1966 House-passed
version,273 but Senator Mondale's 1967 version deleted the phrase "and the right
of every person to be protected against" and also deleted "lease" and "use,"
leaving it to read: "It is the policy of the United States to prevent discrimination
on account of race, color, religion, or national origin in the purchase, rental,
financing, and occupancy of housing throughout the United States. 274 The
deletion of "lease" makes sense because Mondale also deleted this word from the
rest of the statute,275 but it is unclear why he deleted "use" while leaving in
"occupancy."
In any event, whatever interpretive meaning this version may have had was
ultimately diluted by the fact that Senator Dirksen's version changed it to read
simply: "It is the policy of the United States to provide for fair housing
throughout the United States. 276 Senator Dirksen gave no explanation for this
change,277 and his version was ultimately enacted, after being amended on the
Senate floor to include the phrase "within constitutional limitations. 278
271. See 112 CONG. REC. 9396 (1966).
272. See also supra notes 187, 269.
273. See 112 CONG. REC. 18111 (1966).
274. See 1967 Judiciary Hearings, supra note 261, at 439.
275. See supra note 262.
276. 114 CONG. REc. 4571 (1968).
277. Id. For an argument that "the Dirksen substitute was seen by Congress as making only
superficial changes to the bill's policy statement" and that this statement's changes from "use and
occupancy" to "occupancy" and finally simply to a broad guarantee of "fair housing" do not
indicate the statute should be limited to home-seeking as opposed to home-occupancy, see Short,
supra note 81, at 231.
278. See 114 CONG. REc. 4985-86 (1968) (reporting passage of the amendment adding "within
constitutional limitations").
Despite these late changes in the FHA's policy statement, its original version may still have
some interpretive value. For example, Professor Oliveri has argued that the original policy
statement supports construing the FHA to apply to post-acquisition discrimination:
There is . . . no indication that the change signaled Congress' intent to exclude
discrimination that affects occupancy from the list of conduct that the Act prohibits. If
anything, the fact that a prohibition against discrimination in all aspects of
housing-sales, rentals, financing, and occupancy-was included in the first three
versions of the bill but omitted from the final version in favor of a broad statement of
commitment to fair housing, indicates that Congress specifically intended "fair housing"
to include the right to purchase, rent, finance, and occupy housing free of
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C. Source of the Language in § 3604(a) and § 3604(b)
1. The 1964 Civil Rights Act.-While it is clear that the key language of §
3604(a) and § 3604(b) traces back to the original 1966 proposal by President
Johnson, it is not clear why such language was included in the Administration's
fair housing bill. None of the Administration's explanations of this proposal
focuses on the specific purpose or language of what was to become § 3604(a) and
§ 3604(b).279
Despite this lack of direct evidence concerning the rationale for the language
used in the Administration's 1966 bill, it seems likely that the source for much
of this language was the employment discrimination law that Congress had
enacted two years earlier as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.280 Indeed,
discrimination.
Oliveri, supra note 82, at 28 (footnote omitted).
The argument is that the original drafters of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) thought they were
providing substantive prohibitions that could fairly be described as protecting, inter alia, the "use
and occupancy" of housing. See also Civil Rights: Hearing on S. 3296, Amendment 561 to S. 3296,
S. 1497, S. 1654, S. 2846, S. 2923 and S. 3170 Before Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 308 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings] (setting forth a
memorandum dated June 2, 1966, by the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service on
"The Power of Congress to Prohibit Racial Discrimination in the Rental, Sale, Use, and Occupancy
of Private Housing" (emphasis added)); id. at 362 (statement of Frankie Freeman, U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights) (describing the fair housing title of S. 3296 as outlawing discrimination "in the
rental, sale, financing, use, and occupancy of housing" (emphasis added)); id. at 904 (statement of
Sen. Robert C. Byrd) (addressing the question "Does Congress Have Power to Prohibit Racial
Discrimination in the Rental, Sale, Use, and Occupancy of Private Housing?" (emphasis added)).
As further evidence of the broad substantive scope of the original Johnson Administration's
proposal, a memorandum prepared for the House described the Administration's bill as "imply[ing]
the total elimination of discrimination in housing." 112 CONG. REc. 18,117 (1966) (Legislative
Reference Service, Library of Congress, "Analysis of the Open Housing Provisions of the
Administration's Proposed 'Civil Rights Act of 1966' as Amended by the House of
Representative's Committee on the Judiciary").
This argument is the reason I use the word "diluted"-rather than, say, "eliminated"-in the
text to describe the impact of the Dirksen changes to the FHA's policy statement on the interpretive
value of this statement's earlier versions.
279. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REc. 9399 (1966) (providing the Attorney General's explanation of
the bill, which includes only general statements about coverage and no specific reference to the
prohibitory phrasing of the bill's substantive provisions).
280. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). The structure and much of the language used in
the other two substantive antidiscrimination titles in the 1964 Civil Rights Act-Title II ("Public
Accommodations") and Title VI ("Federally Assisted Programs")-generally do not parallel those
of the Administration's fair housing proposal. For example, unlike Title VII and the fair housing
bill, which outlaw a series of enumerated practices if undertaken because of race or other prohibited
ground, Title II simply uses one sentence to declare that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
many of the substantive provisions of the Administration's fair housing proposal
closely track the language in Title VII,28' and, to the extent these similarities were
maintained in the enacted version of the FHA, courts have generally found it
appropriate to interpret these provisions consistently with their Title VII
counterparts.282
Specifically, Title VII made it unlawful for employers and certain other
entities "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, tenns,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. "283 This single provision includes a prohibition
against "otherwise... discriminat[ing] [in] terms, conditions, or privileges" that
presumably spawned both the FHA's prohibition against "otherwise make
unavailable" in § 3604(a) and its "terms, conditions, or privileges" prohibition
in § 3604(b).
Beyond dividing these prohibitions into two subsections in the FHA, the
Johnson Administration's 1966 proposal also added to subsection (b) a
prohibition against discrimination "in the provision of services or facilities in
and equal enjoyment" of places of public accommodations. Id. § 2000a-(a). Title VI provides a
similarly cryptic guarantee that "[n]o person in the United States shall ... be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving [flederal financial assistance." Id. § 2000d.
As ultimately enacted, the FHA does contain certain exemptions that parallel some of those
in Title II as well as Title VII. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(e), (b)(1) (Title II exemptions dealing
with private clubs and "Mrs. Murphy" lodgings), and infra note 281 (describing Title VII
exemptions) with the FHA's private club and "Mrs. Murphy" exemptions in 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a)
and § 3603(b)(2), respectively. However, these FHA exemptions were not a part of the original fair
housing bill proposed by the Johnson Administration in 1966. See sources cited supra note 256.
281. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 283 (quoting Title VII's key substantive
provision, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), which outlaws practices that roughly correspond to the
FHA's prohibitions in §3604(a) and §3604(b)). Title VH also prohibits retaliation against those
who have exercised their rights under this statute, id. § 2000e-3(a), a provision that is somewhat
similar to § 3617's protections against coercion and interference with fair housing rights. In
addition, Title Vl's exemptions for religious organizations, private clubs, and small employers, see
id. § 2000e-l(a), § 2000e(b)(2), and § 2000e(b) respectively, are reflected in similar exemptions
in the FHA. See id. §§ 3603(b), 3607(a).
282. See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 7.4 nn.3-4. See generally Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("when Congress uses the same
language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the
other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both
statutes" (citing Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427,428 (1973)); see
also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1985) (relying on precedents
interpreting Title VH's guarantee of nondiscrimination in "privileg[es] of employment" to interpret
the same phrase in the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); see also id. §§ 2000e-2(b), (c)(1), (d).
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connection therewith. ' '284 This phrase's "services and facilities" language, while
not in Title VII, may have been adopted from Title 1U of the 1964 Act, which
prohibits discrimination in public accommodations by guaranteeing the "equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations" in such facilities. 25 Another possible source for the FHA's
"services and facilities" language may have been state fair housing laws in
existence at the time the Johnson Administration drafted its 1966 proposal.286
Whatever its source, the FHA's guarantee of nondiscrimination "in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith" is a phrase whose
meaning both with respect to the "services" covered and the target of the "in
connection therewith" reference (i.e., "sale or rental of a dwelling" or just "a
dwelling") is important for purposes of determining the extent of § 3604(b)'s
coverage. However, as to both issues, the meaning of this crucial phrase in §
3604(b) was never satisfactorily explained in the FHA's legislative history.
Title VII's prohibitory language makes clear that this statute protects against
discrimination directed at current employees as well as job seekers by outlawing
discrimination with respect to one's "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. '287  However, in confining § 3604 to homeseekers,
Judge Posner in Halprin wrote that, in contrast to Title VII, the FHA "contains
no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern with anything
but access to housing. 288
As shown in the previous section, this statement is clearly wrong as to the
FHA's legislative history.289 As for the operative language of § 3604(b), it is, if
anything, more broadly drawn than its Title VII counterpart. The FHA provision
is not confined, as Title VII is, to discrimination "against an[] individual with
respect to his" employment terms;290 rather, § 3604(b) simply declares the
discriminatory practices listed to be illegal without identifying the potential
targets of such discrimination.29' This, among other reasons, has led courts to
entertain § 3604 claims by a variety of plaintiffs who were not the direct targets
284. See id. § 3604(b); supra text accompanying note 258.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (emphasis added).
286. See, e.g., 1966 Hearings, supra note 278, at 430-31 (setting forth provisions of the Rhode
Island fair housing law that barred managing agents and those having the right to manage housing
accommodations from discriminating "in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or
lease of any such housing accommodation or in the furnishing offacilities or services in connection
therewith" (emphasis added)); id. at 531 (setting forth the Ohio fair housing law that barred
discrimination "in the terms or conditions of selling, transferring, assigning, renting, leasing, or
subleasing any commercial housing or in furnishingfacilities, services, or privileges in connection
with the ownership, occupancy, or use of any commercial housing" (emphasis added)).
287. See supra text accompanying note 283.
288. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327,329 (7th
Cir. 2004).
289. See supra notes 258-78 and accompanying text.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
291. Id. § 3604(b).
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of the defendant's discrimination.292 Furthermore, as we have seen, § 3604(b)'s
"services and facilities" phrase goes beyond anything included in Title VII's
comparable provision. Therefore, the next section takes a closer look at this
phrase and other key terms in § 3604(b).
2. Other Interpretive Sources for Key Terms in § 3604(b): Dictionary
Definitions, FHAA Examples, and § 1982 Precedents.-The FHA has a section
devoted to defining certain important terms and phrases in the statute;
293
however, except for "to rent, '294 this section does not define the terms crucial to
this Article, such as "services," "privileges," "sale," and "therewith" in §
3604(b). 295 The absence of such definitions in the FHA has been noted in a
number of court opinions, particularly those attempting to give meaning to the
word "services" in § 3604(b).296
Specific words in civil rights and other statutes are often interpreted by the
modem Supreme Court by reference to their definitions in dictionaries that were
commonly used at the time of enactment. 297 The theory is that Congress intends
a statute's words to bear their contemporary common meaning.298
292. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-78 (1982); Trafficante v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972); cf. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544
U.S. 167, 179 (2005) (construing Title IX to cover retaliation claims by indirect victims of sex
discrimination because it bans discrimination "on the basis of sex" rather than, like Title VII, "on
the basis of such individual's sex").
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602.
294. See id. § 3602(e). The definition of "to rent" is set forth infra in the text accompanying
note 340; see also supra note 262 (discussing this definition).
295. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602. The text here discusses § 3604(b)'s language, but the same lack
of statutory definitions-and the corresponding need for additional interpretive sources-exists for
many of § 3604(a)'s key terms, including the word "sale" that is shared with § 3604(b) and §
3604(a)'s unique "make unavailable" phrase. See id. § 3604(a). As to the latter, the common
dictionary definitions of "make" and "available" suggest that "make unavailable" means "to cause
[housing not] to be obtainable, accessible, or ready for immediate use." See WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1363 (1966)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S] (defining "make" as "to cause to happen to or be experienced by
someone"); id. at 150 (defining "available" as "that is accessible or may be obtained: personally
obtainable").
296. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir. 1995)
(noting that "[tihe Fair Housing Act does not define key terms such as 'service' (quoting NAACP
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992))); Savanna Club Worship Serv.,
Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1227-28 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(noting that the FHA does not define "services").
297. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-67 (2006)
(interpreting Title VII); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 & n.9 (1989)
(interpreting the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983); St. Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481
U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987) (interpreting the 1866 Civil Rights Act).
298. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence of [a statutory]
definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." (citing
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As for the word "services" in § 3604(b), the most prominent American
dictionary available at the time of the enactment of the 1968 FHA provided the
following applicable definitions of "service": "an act done for the benefit or at
the command of another"; and an "action or use that furthers some end or
purpose: conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something:
deeds useful or instrumental towards some object., 299  This definition is so
broad-e.g., any conduct that "assists or benefits someone"-that it is unhelpful.
More to the point would be what are considered "housing-related" services.
In this regard, the 1988 FHAA's legislative history does identify "cleaning and
janitorial services" as an example of this concept for purposes of disability-based
claims under § 3604(f)(2), 3°° suggesting that "services" in the FHA does include
those provided in the post-acquisition-of-housing stage.3", As we have seen,
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,42 (1979)
("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (citing Bums v. Alcala, 420
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975))); see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228
(1994) (relying, in choosing among various dictionary definitions of the relevant term in a statute,
primarily on those dictionaries that were available at the time of the statute's enactment); case
described supra note 255.
299. WEBSTER'S, supra note 295, at 2075 (definitions 5 and 9 of "service"); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1533 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter BLACK'S] (defining "service" as: "Performance
of labor for benefit of another, or at another's command").
300. See supra text accompanying note 196.
301. The 1988 FHAA included one other provision, since repealed, that mentioned "facilities
and services." This was in a part of the "housing for older persons" exemption to the FHAA's
prohibition of familial status discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988) (amended 1995). The
FHAA's § 3607(b)(2) described three types of housing that would qualify for this exemption, one
of which was housing intended for occupancy by persons fifty-five years of age or older and that
included "significant facilities and services specifically designed to meet the physical or social
needs of older persons." Id. § 3607(b)(2)(C). HUD promptly issued a regulation interpreting this
provision, which provided:
"Significant facilities and services specifically designed to meet the physical or social
needs of older persons" include, but are not limited to, social and recreational programs,
continuing education, information and counseling, recreational, homemaker, outside
maintenance and referral services, an accessible physical environment, emergency and
preventive health care of [sic] programs, congregate dining facilities, transportation to
facilitate access to social services, and services designed to encourage and assist
residents to use the services and facilities available to them.
24 C.F.R. § 100.304(b)(1) (1993).
This "significant facilities and services" requirement spawned a great deal of litigation, which
led Congress to repeal it in 1995. See Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-76, 109
Stat. 787; Taylor v. Rancho Santa Barbara, 206 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 2000). However, in the
meantime, the courts produced a number of opinions dealing with the meaning of "significant
facilities and services." See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 1 E:8 n.5 para. 3.
The value of these cases and the HUD regulation is limited for purposes of providing examples
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Congress was clearly concerned with post-acquisition services as well as those
connected with the acquisition of a dwelling. 2 With respect to acquisition-of-
housing services-which Halprin and Cox contend was the only focus of the
1968 Congress in § 3604(b)3° 3-the technique of using dictionary definitions is
not too helpful. Clearly such housing-acquisition services do exist, as
demonstrated by cases that have held § 3604(b) applicable to home insurance for
would-be buyers3 4 and to sales agents' racial steering of homeseekers. °5 Pre-
of "services" covered by § 3604(b), however, because they tended to focus only on services
provided by senior-oriented housing facilities, as opposed to those provided by more traditional
housing and by third parties such as municipalities. See, e.g., United States v. City of Hayward, 36
F.3d 832, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the particular housing complex here-although
having a swimming pool, sauna, shuffle board, laundry room, reading room, and clubhouse, and
allowing outside health professionals to conduct blood pressure and glaucoma checks and
administer flu shots---only "provided those facilities which any landlord expecting to please his or
her tenants would provide" and thus did not satisfy the statute's "significant facilities and services"
for older persons requirement).
302. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
303. See supra texts accompanying notes 66-70 (Halprin) and notes 98-101 (Cox). According
to the Cox opinion: "Even assuming that the enforcement of zoning laws alleged here is a 'service,'
we hold that § 3604(b) is inapplicable here because the service was not 'connected' to the sale or
rental of a dwelling as the statute requires." Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir.
2005) (footnote omitted).
304. See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298-301 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that property insurance is a "service" under § 3604(b) and noting: "If the world of
commerce is divided between 'goods' and 'services,' then insurers supply a 'service.' ... [Thus,]
§ 3604 applies to discriminatory denials of insurance, and discriminatory pricing, that effectively
preclude ownership of housing because of the race of the applicant."); cf. Nevels v. W. World Ins.
Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding, in disability discrimination case
under § 3604(f)(2), that defendant's cancellation of housing providers' liability insurance
constituted discrimination "in the provision of services related to a dwelling" and that "[piroperty
insurance is without question a service provided in connection with a dwelling"); Wai v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding § 3604(f)(2) claim of disability
discrimination against insurance provider).
305. See, e.g., Vill. ofBellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,1529 (7th Cir. 1990) (opining that
a real estate broker who falsely states to a black customer that no homes are for sale in a white area
because of the customer's race violates § 3604(b) by discriminating "in the provision of real estate
services"); McDonald v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a real estate
agent who "failed to tell [black prospects] of the listing of the.., property until forced to do so and
still later ... clearly made available information to a white prospect which he had not made
available to a willing black buyer" thereby violated § 3604(b)); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood
Coal. v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that racial steering
'violates the broader language of § 3604(b), which makes it unlawful to 'discriminate... in the
provisions of services"); cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 14:2 n.18; see also 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.65(b)(3) (2007) (interpreting § 3604(b) to prohibit "[flailing to process an offer for the sale
or rental of a dwelling or to communicate an offer accurately because of race [or other prohibited
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Halprin cases had also applied § 3604(b)'s guarantee of nondiscriminatory
services in post-acquisition situations, such as the provision of maintenance by
landlords.3t 6
The phrase "in connection therewith" that modifies "services" in § 3604(b)
does not appear in traditional dictionaries. The word "therewith" is defined as
"with that," and "that" means "being the person, thing, or idea pointed to,
mentioned, or understood from the situation: being the one indicated. 3 °7
However, these definitions do not help resolve the key question, which is to what
the "services" in § 3604(b) point. The courts have thought the choices are the
earlier references to either "a dwelling" (which would yield a broader reading of
§ 3604(b)-covered services) or the "sale or rental of a dwelling" (which would
yield a narrower reading).3"8 In any event, the proper interpretation is more a
matter of grammar and syntax than the definition of terms.
"Therewith" is an ambiguous adverb, rarely used in grammar or style
textbooks. 309 As noted in the previous paragraph, its meaning depends on the
construction of the particular sentence involved. That is not helpful in examining
§ 3604(b), because the structure of that provision makes it difficult to determine
exactly to what "thing" is being "pointed." The best way to make this
determination is to diagram the sentence that makes up § 3604(b), which yields
the following:
ground]").
306. See, e.g., Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Indian Trails Apartments v. Indian Trails
Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (N.D. Il. 1980); see also Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v.
United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714,720 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (commenting that § 3604(b) was intended
to protect residents with discriminatory service claims against housing providers); Lindsey v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641-43 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (holding that defendant's non-
renewal of property insuranze and its charging higher rates in black areas may violate plaintiff-
homeowners' § 3604(b) rights, because "the provision of property insurance can be reasonably
interpreted as the 'provision of services or facilities in connection' with the sale or rental of a
dwelling" and "[mlaintaining possession of a home is as important to a homeowner as obtaining
possession of a home"); Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed.
Reg. 3232, 3239 (Jan. 23, 1989) (commenting, in the course of issuing HUD's regulations
interpreting the FHA, that § 3604(b) covers "the provision of different levels of maintenance").
307. WEBSTER'S, supra note 295, at 2367, 2372.
308. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
309. "Therewith" is generally not even mentioned in classic works on style. See, e.g., THE
CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 917 (14th ed. 1993) (providing no reference in the index to
"therewith"); LESTER FAIGLEY,THEPENGUIN HANDBOOK 856 (2003) (same) WILLIAM STRUNK, JR.
& E. B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTs OF STYLE 104 (4th ed. 2000) (same); see also MARGARET
NICHOLSON, A DICTIONARY OFAMERICAN-ENGLISH USAGE 585-86 (1957) (containing no entry for
"therewith").
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(Bear with me here: my Mother was a grade-school English teacher, as was my
current research assistant.310)
This diagram reveals that, from a grammatical standpoint, neither "a
dwelling" nor the "sale or rental of a dwelling" is the target for § 3604(b)'s
"therewith" clause; rather, "therewith" refers to the phrase "in the terms,
conditions, or privileges."31' This is an adverbial prepositional phrase describing
how one discriminates under § 3604(b), while both "a dwelling" and the "sale or
rental of a dwelling" are prepositional phrases that further explain what types of
310. Sarah Sloan Wilson, J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Kentucky College of Law. Ms.
Wilson, who generated the diagram of § 3604(b) in the text, taught middle- and high-school English
at King's West School, Bremerton, Washington, in 2004-06, where her basic grammar text was
WARRINER'S ENGLISH GRAMMAR AND COMPOSMON (1982 ed.).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
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"terms, conditions, and privileges" discrimination are prohibited.1 2 In other
words, the phrase "of sale or rental of a dwelling" is itself comprised of two
modifying prepositional phrases, and thus the "thing" referenced by the
"therewith" clause is discrimination in the entire phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling. '
While this may be grammatically correct, it does not yield a helpful
interpretation of § 3604(b)'s "services or facilities in connection therewith"
clause, which clearly was intended by Congress to add new types of prohibited
discrimination to the earlier prohibitions against "terms, conditions, or
privileges" discrimination. 314 Therefore, it is understandable that courts have
interpreted § 3604(b)'s use of "in connection therewith" to refer either to "a
dwelling" or to the "sale or rental of a dwelling."3 ' The main point here is that,
while a court may pick one or the other of these options, its choice cannot be
defended on the basis of correct grammar, as Judge Higginbotham tried to do in
Cox; 31 6 because either option is "wrong" grammatically, the choice must turn
instead on what Congress intended substantively. And on this point, we have
scant evidence from the 1968 legislative history. 7 However, even assuming the
narrower interpretation (i.e., that "services" are limited to those "in connection"
with the "sale or rental of a dwelling" 318), the proper interpretation of § 3604(b)
should still extend to many post-acquisition situations, as the following
paragraphs show.
With respect to the concept of "privileges" in § 3604(b)-which the statute
clearly does limit to those "privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling"3 9-the
most prominent contemporary dictionary provided the following definitions of
"privilege": "a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or
favor: special enjoyment of a good or exemption from an evil or burden: a
peculiar or personal advantage or right [especially] when enjoyed in derogation
of common right[s]. ' '320 The fact that a privilege is something to be "enjoyed"
312. See id.
313. See id. (emphasis added).
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that § 3604(b)'s
"in connection therewith" phrase refers to the "sale or rental of a dwelling" rather than "a dwelling"
on the ground that the former reading is "grammatically superior").
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
319. Id. § 3604(b); see also Cox, 430 F.3d at 745 n.32.
320. WEBSTER'S, supra note 295, at 1805 (definition I of "privilege"); see also BLACK'S,
supra note 299, at 1359, 1361 (defining "privilege" as: "A particular and peculiar benefit or
advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other
citizens" and defining "special privilege" as: "A right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege
granted to, or vested in, a person or class of person, to the exclusion of others, and in derogation
of common right").
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may suggest that it is an on-going condition that exists over time.32' Furthermore,
a housing-related example based on the 1988 FHAA's legislative history is
"parking privileges ... and other facilities ... made available to other tenants,
residents, and owners." '322 This statement clearly contemplates post-acquisition
privileges, but, as noted above, the 1988 Congress's concern with post-
acquisition privileges was reflected in the statutory language of § 3604(f)(2).323
In order to properly interpret "privileges" in § 3604(b)-and to determine
whether this concept might include post-acquisition privileges-the entire phrase
"privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling" must be considered.324 This approach
was the basis for Judge Higginbotham's determination in Cox that § 3604(b)'s
"privileges" did not cover the plaintiff-homeowners' claim challenging the City's
refusal there to use its zoning power to help clean up hazardous wastes in the
plaintiffs' neighborhood.325
If Cox is right that enjoying municipal protection against hazardous wastes
is not a "privilege of sale or rental, 326 then what is such a privilege? Case law
here is not too helpful, because, in contrast to the many "services" cases under
§ 3604(b),327 there is a dearth of reported FHA cases dealing with a claim based
solely on the term "privileges" in § 3604(b).328
Presumably, "privileges" here adds some protection to that of "services" and
the other terms used in § 3604(b), for a basic tenet of statutory construction holds
that each word in a statute must be accorded some meaning.329 Thus, one must
be able to imagine some "privileges of sale' 33° that do extend beyond the
acquisition stage. One possibility is the classic "exclusion of others" that is a
core right inherent in ownership of real property; 33' another possibility is
321. See also United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004) (criticizing
Halprin's view that § 3604(b) does not extend beyond the housing-acquisition stage in the course
of holding that this provision applies to a sex-harassment-in-rental claim and arguing that "it is
difficult to imagine a privilege that flows more naturally from the purchase or rental of a dwelling
than the privilege of residing therein").
322. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 23 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,2184.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
325. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 n.32 (5th Cir. 2005).
326. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
327. See supra notes 296, 301, 304-06 and accompanying text.
328. For a rare example, see United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004)
(described supra note 321).
329. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,697-98
(1995) (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)).
330. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
331. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176-80 (1979) (noting that a
landowner's right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property" and that "the 'right to exclude' [is] universally held to be
a fundamental element of the property right"). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730 (1998).
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discussed later in this section.332
A useful case to consider here is Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
3 3
3
which the Supreme Court decided in 1969, one year after it first held that 42
U.S.C. § 1982 barred private housing discrimination along with the recently
enacted FHA. 3 In Sullivan, the Court held that § 1982's guarantee of the equal
right "to ... lease... property" protected a black tenant who had rented a house
and thereafter was denied access to a local park and community facility that tied
membership to residency in the area.335 According to the Sullivan opinion:
There has never been any doubt but that [the black renter] paid part of
his $129 monthly rental for the assignment of the membership share in
Little Hunting Park. The transaction clearly fell within the "lease." The
right to "lease" is protected by § 1982 against the actions of third parties,
as well as against the actions of the immediate lessor. [Defendants']
actions in refusing to approve the assignment of the membership share
in this case was clearly an interference with [the black renter's] right to
"lease."
336
The lesson here is that, given the 1969 Court's determination that the right "to
lease" in § 1982 protects tenants even after they have acquired their units, the
same understanding of the time period covered by the FHA's "rental" in §
3604(b) would make this provision similarly applicable to the post-acquisition
phase. This idea is further explored in the next two paragraphs.
Another dramatic point from Sullivan is provided by the dissent, which
argued that the Court should avoid using this case to issue an expansive ruling
on § 1982 because its fact pattern was so obviously covered by the new FHA.
According to Justice Harlan for the three dissenters in Sullivan:
Petitioners here complain of discrimination in the provision of
recreation facilities ancillary to a rented house .... [T]he Fair Housing
Law has a provision that explicitly makes it unlawful to "discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of... rental (of
housing), or in the provisions [sic] of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race ....
... [T]he existence of the Fair Housing Law renders the decision of
this case of little "importance to the public." For, although the 1968 Act
does not cover this particular case [because the events preceded the
FHA's enactment], should a Negro in the future rent a house but be
denied access to ancillary recreational facilities on account of race, he
could in all likelihood secure relief under the provisions of the Fair
332. See infra text accompanying notes 347-49.
333. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
334. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
335. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237.
336. Id. at 236-37.
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Housing Law.337
This passage shows that even the Sullivan dissenters understood that § 3604(b)
protects renters after they take possession of their units. Furthermore, the less-
than-certain tone of this passage's final sentence-reflected in the statement that
such renters "could in all likelihood" secure relief under the FHA-was only
based on the possibility that the unit involved might be subject to one of the
FHA's exemptions, as Justice Harlan pointed out in a footnote; 338 if a unit is not
exempt, the Sullivan dissent was clear that post-acquisition tenants subjected to
discriminatory services or facilities are covered by § 3604(b).339
These points from Sullivan are reinforced by the FHA's definitions section,
which provides: "'To rent' includes to lease, to sublease, to let and otherwise to
grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not owned by the
occupant."3'4 Thus, the concept of "rental" in the FHA explicitly includes "to
lease" (i.e., the concept given post-acquisition protection in Sullivan).
Admittedly, the FHA's "rent" definition, which simply includes additional terms
rather than defining what "rent" means, does not address the timing problem of
whether § 3604(b)'s protections extend into the post-acquisition period. This,
however, is where a dictionary definition is helpful. The standard definition in
dictionaries available when the 1968 FHA was enacted defines "rent" to include
"the possession and use" and the "possession and enjoyment" of property,34'
suggesting that "rental" in the FHA should be understood to cover the entire time
period of a tenancy. Thus, both Sullivan and the common meaning of "rental"
provide powerful arguments that § 3604(b) protects residents as well as
homeseekers, at least in "rental" situations.342
337. Id. at 247-51 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
338. Id. at 251 & n.24.
339. Id. at 250-51.
340. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(e) (2000).
341. WEBSTER'S, supra note 295, at 1923; see also BLACK'S, supra note 299, at 1461
(defining "rent" as: "Consideration paid for use or occupancy of property").
342. Post-Halprin decisions have generally upheld § 3604(b) claims by current tenants. See,
e.g., Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments Ltd. P'ship, No. 05C0348, 2006 WL 1519320, at *6-7
(N.D. Ill. May 31, 2006) (reading Halprin as allowing plaintiff-tenants' discriminatory services
claim under § 3604(b) because "the delay in maintenance services could be viewed as a denial of
access to the services to which [plaintiffs] were entitled under the terms of the lease," but entering
summary judgment against this claim based on inadequate proof of illegal discrimination); Richards
v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC- 1OGRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *2-5 & n. 16 (M.D. Fla. May 2,2005)
(upholding § 3604(b) claim by tenant alleging sexual harassment by her landlord in part based on
deference to HUD's regulation interpreting § 3604(b) as applying to post-acquisition rental
discrimination, which the court held to be a reasonable interpretation "even if one considered the
phrase 'in connection therewith' to refer to 'rental' rather than 'dwelling"'); see also United States
v. Matusoff Rental Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746-48 & n.lI, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (awarding
damages to tenant for landlord's violations of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) by, inter alia, denying repair
work and other needed maintenance based on tenant's race); Campos v. Barney G, Inc., No.
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The timing issue is less clear with respect to § 3604(b)'s coverage of "sales."
The basic definition of "sale" is "the act of selling: a contract transferring the
absolute or general ownership of property from one person or corporate body to
another for a price... ; specif a present transfer of such ownership of and title
to all of or a part interest in personal property." '3 43 The key here is not so much
the body of this definition, but its introductory word-the use of "the" or
"a"-which suggests that "sale," unlike "rental," generally refers to a one-time
event rather than an on-going process. Significantly, Halprin and most other
cases-including Cox-that have advocated limiting § 3604(b) to the pre-
acquisition phase have been brought by plaintiff-homeowners rather than
plaintiff-renters. 3" Dictionary definitions, therefore, provide some basis for
arguing that § 3604(b) should not extend to the post-acquisition stage in "sale"
situations, even if it is not so limited in "rental" cases.345
8:06CV699, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24841, at *3-5 (D. Neb. Apr. 3, 2007) (awarding damages to
Hispanic tenants who sued their landlord for post-acquisition "terms and conditions"
discrimination); United States v. Kreisler, No. 03-3599, slip op. at 2, (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/kreislersettle.pdf (entering consent decree
in case accusing landlord of violating the FHA by, inter alia, "failing to provide necessary and
requested maintenance to black tenants while providing such maintenance to non-black tenants");
cases described infra note 345.
343. WEBSTER'S, supra note 295, at 2003 (definition 1 of "sale"); see also BLACK'S, supra
note 299, at 1503 (defining "sale" as: "A contract between two parties ... by which the [seller-
vendor], in consideration of the payment or promise of payment of a certain price in money,
transfers to the [buyer-purchaser] the title and the possession of property"; and "A contract whereby
property is transferred from one person to another for a consideration of value, implying the passing
of the general and absolute title").
344. See cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 14:3 n.20 1. Even in "sale" situations,
however, some courts have upheld § 3604(b) claims by current homeowners. E.g., Beard v.
Worldwide Mortgage Corp., 354 F. Supp. 2d 789, 808-09 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); Gibson v. County
of Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1083-84 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815
F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940,
943-45 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding standing of residents of minority neighborhood to sue under the
FHA, § 1981, and § 1982 based on allegation that defendants charged higher rates for homeowner's
insurance in plaintiffs' neighborhood than in comparable white areas); United Farm Bureau Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1008, 1012-16 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the FHA and a substantially equivalent local fair housing ordinance cover claim by white
resident that insurance company declined to renew his homeowner's policy because he lived in a
racially mixed neighborhood); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20-22
& n.7 (D.D.C. 2000) (suggesting that "reverse redlining" claim by current homeowners targeted for
predatory home-improvement loans might be maintained under § 3604); Reeves v. Carrollsburg
Condo. Owners Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU, 1997 WL 1877201, at *5-8 (D.D.C. Dec. 18,
1997) (citing § 3604(a), § 3604(b), and § 3617 in upholding condominium owner's FHA claim of
race and sexual harassment against association of condominium unit owners).
345. Indeed, some post-Halprin decisions have noted this distinction explicitly as a basis for
endorsing post-acquisition claims by renters. See Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass'n of
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However, the question of whether there is any such thing as a post-
acquisition "privilege of sale" remains. One possibility might be the privilege of
joining local recreational clubs whose membership is tied to residency in the
area, as the Supreme Court has recognized in some § 1982 cases decided shortly
after the FHA's enactment. For example, in 1973 in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 4 the Court relied on Sullivan to uphold a § 1982 claim
by local black homeowners who were denied membership in an area swim
club.347 In Tillman, the Court noted that the club's residency-linked preferences
may have affected the price paid by the [black homeowners] when they
bought their home. Thus, the purchase price to them, like the rental paid
by [the black tenant] in Sullivan, may well reflect benefits dependent on
residency in the preference area. For them, however, the right to acquire
a home in the area is abridged and diluted.
When an organization links membership benefits to residency in a
narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the
bundle of rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing
within the area. The mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 then operates to
guarantee a nonwhite resident, who purchases, leases, or holds this
property, the same rights as are enjoyed by a white resident.348
Although Tillman used the word "benefits" rather than "privileges" to describe
the residency-based right there, such a right could certainly be considered a
"privilege" of sale for purposes of § 3604(b). Indeed, at least one post-Halprin
opinion has ruled that the right of homeowners in a planned community to have
access to their community's clubhouse and other common areas is a "privilege"
of sale covered by § 3604(b).
349
Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1230-31 n. Il (M.D. Fla. 2003), order vacated pursuant
to settlement, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003)
(commenting, in rejecting a post-acquisition § 3604(a) claim by homeowners, that the time frames
covered in rental and sale situations are different, because "a landlord and tenant have an ongoing
relationship that a purchaser and seller do not have. This would make activities by a landlord or
others actionable after the rental of a dwelling."); see also Corwin v. B'Nai B'Rith Senior Citizen
Hous., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 405,408-09 (D. Del. 2007) (commenting, after quoting § 3604(b), that
"[t]he FHA demands that tenants be able to secure an apartment on a nondiscriminatory basis, and
also guarantees tenants the right to equal treatment once they have become residents of that
housing" (citing Inland Medication Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1148 (C.D. Cal.
2001))).
346. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
347. Id. at 435-37.
348. Id. at 437.
349. Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1229-31 (S.D. Fla. 2005). In Savanna Club, the court, while generally agreeing
with Halprin and Cox that § 3604(b) is limited to the acquisition-of-housing stage, did not agree
that such an interpretation could
apply to unique planned communities such as Savanna. Ordinarily, a homeowner
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D. Summary
This Part's sections A-C yield the following conclusions:
-The original drafters of the substantive provisions of § 3604-and in
particular its subsection (b)-were focused on identifying discriminatory
practices that would be made illegal if engaged in by housing providers,
including those who "manage" housing units.
-This fact means that the substantive prohibitions in § 3604(b)-and
in particular its prohibition against discriminatory "services" and
"privileges"-were drafted with housing providers in mind, which may
be one reason why determining how to apply them to other types of
defendants (e.g., municipalities) has proved difficult for the courts.
-It also means that these prohibitions were intended to protect current
residents-as well as those seeking to acquire housing-from
discrimination by housing managers (and ultimately other proper
defendants) in such things as cleaning and janitorial services and
maintenance, at least in "rental" settings.
purchases a home for the home itself. After the sale, provision or lack of provision of
services for that homeowner might decrease his enjoyment of his home, but absent some
interference with his ability to inhabit it, the Halprin line of cases have found the FHA
to be inapplicable. Halprin, and other similar cases, however, did not directly address
the provision of services as they relate to planned communities where some types of
services are in fact part and parcel with home ownership.
Most of these communities have common areas which are maintained and
regulated by the community's homeowner association for the use by the homeowner
members....
Accordingly, part and parcel of the purchase of a home within a planned
community are the rights and privileges associated with membership within the
community. It would appear, therefore, that in the context of planned communities,
where association members have rights to use designated common areas as an incident
of their ownership, discriminatory conduct which deprives them of exercising those
rights would be actionable under the FHA....
.... [Thus,] the Court finds that the FHA can apply to some post-acquisition
provision of services in the planned community context where the services are an
incident of ownership ....
Id. at 1229-31 (citations and footnotes omitted). As this quotation demonstrates, the Savanna Club
opinion relies both on the "services" and "privileges" language of § 3604(b), but, in either case, the
opinion recognizes the possibility that such services or privileges "of sale" may extend into the
post-acquisition phase, at least in planned communities and other home-ownership situations where
access to common areas is "part and parcel" of the right of ownership. Id.
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-The conclusion that § 3604(b) extends to post-acquisition
discrimination in rentals is reinforced by the fact that those same drafters
wrote an introductory policy statement describing the FHA as protecting,
inter alia, the "use and occupancy" of housing and by the fact that the
common dictionary meaning of their oft-used word "rental" covers a
tenant's entire lease term.
-Even with respect to housing acquired through a "sale," § 3604(b)'s
guarantee of nondiscriminatory services and privileges should be read to
apply in those post-acquisition settings where the "services" or
"privileges" at issue are part and parcel of the rights obtained in buying
the relevant property (e.g., access to membership in a local swim club or
to the common areas of a condominium or other type of housing with
communal rights).
-These conclusions as to § 3604(b)'s applicability to post-acquisition
discrimination hold true regardless of whether that provision's
"therewith" clause-which controls the "services" part of § 3604(b)-is
read to apply to "a dwelling" or only to "the sale or rental of a dwelling,"
neither of which reading is mandated by the common meaning of
"therewith" or the grammatically correct construction of § 3604(b).
Thus, even if this "services"-controlling clause is thought to target "the
sale or rental of a dwelling," it would still support post-acquisition
"services" claims in all "rental" cases and in some "sale" situations as
well.
These conclusions undercut the rationales put forth by the Seventh Circuit
in Halprin and by the Fifth Circuit in Cox to justify their view that § 3604 does
not cover post-acquisition discrimination. These conclusions also mean that
HUD's regulation interpreting § 3604(b) to cover services and facilities
"associated with a dwelling"35 is a defensible reading of this provision in all
"rental" and in some "sale" cases. This, in turn, means that HUD's regulation
applying § 3617 to interference claims by current residents is correct in all such
cases, even if, as Halprin suggested, § 3617 must be tied to a predicate violation
of §§ 3603-3606.
Despite all this, the question remains whether Cox's holding that the
practices challenged there are outside the scope of § 3604(b) was nevertheless
justified because such practices are neither "services" nor "privileges" covered
by this provision in a "sales" case. This question is addressed next in Part IV.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH TO MUNICIPAL SERVICES CASES
A. What Do Post-Sale "Services" and "Privileges" Cover?
Part II demonstrated that the FHA's § 3604(b) covers housing-related
350. See supra text accompanying note 217.
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"services" and "privileges" even-contrary to Cox's view-in some post-
acquisition "sale" situations where current homeowners are challenging the
defendant's discrimination. This coverage would protect current homeowners
to the extent that the rights they obtained in purchasing their homes included
"services" or "privileges" that are part and parcel of those property rights, such
as the right to use a condominium's common areas.
Parenthetically, it might be argued that such sale-based privileges under §
3604(b) were intended to be co-extensive with the protections provided by §
1982's right to "purchase [and] hold.., real ... property. 35' The argument
would be based on the fact that Congress, in passing the FHA, was fully aware
of § 1982's possible application to housing discrimination352 and on the Supreme
Court's indication shortly thereafter in Sullivan and Tillman that § 1982 protects
current residents against race-based discrimination in ways similar to what was
intended by § 3604(b). 53 Whether § 3604(b)'s coverage in "sale" situations is
exactly equal to § 1982's may be debated, but certainly some similarity seems
appropriate. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court's decision
in City of Memphis thereafter placed some limits on situations where black
homeowners could invoke § 1982 to challenge allegedly discriminatory
municipal actions, although the Court did opine there that discrimination in
municipal services is actionable under § 1982."' 4 In any event and regardless of
its connection to § 1982, § 3604(b)'s sale-based coverage would seem clearly to
extend at least to those services and privileges that are tied to homeowners'
property-based rights.
To determine the extent of such rights, it is worth recalling here the D.C.
Circuit's 1991 opinion in Clifton Terrace Associates, Ltd. v. United Technologies
Corp.355 There, the court ruled against an apartment owner who alleged that the
defendant violated the FHA by refusing to provide elevator service based on the
351. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
352. The Congress that enacted the 1968 FHA was aware of the pending § 1982 litigation in
what was to become Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See, e.g., 1967 Banking
Hearings, supra note 257, at 163 (response to Sen. Mondale's question by Louis H. Pollak, Dean
of Yale Law School).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 333-39 (discussing Sullivan) and notes 347-49
(discussing Tillman). The Court recently cited Sullivan in a far less analogous civil rights case for
the proposition that "'it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was
thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be interpreted
in conformity with [it]."' Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979)). Although the
1968 Congress was not aware of Sullivan, it was aware of other § 1982-based litigation pending
at the time of the FHA's enactment. See supra note 352.
354. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981); see also supra notes 134-47 and
accompanying text.
355. 929 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Clifton Terrace case is further described supra in
notes 231, 234, and text accompanying supra note 240.
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race of the owner's tenants. 6 While holding that neither § 3604(a) nor §
3604(b) covered this situation, the D.C. Circuit did suggest that § 3604(a) would
cover "the denial of certain essential services relating to a dwelling, such as..
. sewer hookups, zoning approval, or basic utilities" if they "result in the denial
of housing. '35 7 As for § 3604(b), Clifton Terrace opined that this provision,
unlike § 3604(a), goes beyond housing denials to address "habitability" issues,
at least with respect to "services and facilities provided in connection with the
sale or rental of housing. 358
It was thus clear to the Clifton Terrace court that § 3604(b) is "directed at
those who provide housing and then discriminate in the provision of attendant
services or facilities, or those who otherwise control the provision of housing
services or facilities.359  The court noted that, in rental situations, this
understanding would be consistent with HUD's regulation outlawing
discriminatory maintenance and services. 360 As for post-acquisition "sales"
situations, Clifton Terrace viewed § 3604(b)'s application to such services as
"not so clear., 361 The court noted that, while the Fourth Circuit in Mackey and
the Seventh Circuit in Southend had opined that § 3604(b) covered
discriminatory municipal services, "[t]he fact that such a discriminatory practice
could have an impact on the use and enjoyment of residential property rights..
. does not necessarily mean that it will also be redressable under [the FHA]." 362
The D.C. Circuit then avoided deciding this question, noting that the defendant
before it-a private service contractor that was not the "sole source" of elevator
services in the area-was distinguishable from a municipal service provider.363
As to the latter, the Clifton Terrace opinion noted:
Like public utilities, municipalities often are the sole source of a service
essential to the habitability of a dwelling. In the case of such an absolute
monopoly, ultimate control over the service in question resides with the
municipality or utility rather than with the provider of housing, and such
a "sole source" could conceivably violate the [§ 3604(b)] rights of
tenants without any intermediate action by the landlord.3 "
356. Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd., 929 F.2d at 723.
357. Id. at 719-20.
358. Id. at 720 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(2) (1988)).
359. Id. (emphasis added).
360. Id. (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (1990)).
361. Id.
362. Id. (citing Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1978)).
363. Id.
364. Id. In her concurrence, Judge Henderson chose not to endorse this "sole source" theory
of liability, finding it unnecessary to deciding the case. Id. at 724 (Henderson, J., concurring). She
did agree with the majority, however, that § 3604(b)'s intended targets were "those who provide
housing and then discriminate in the provision of attendant services or facilities, or those who
otherwise control the provision of housing services or facilities." Id. (quoting id. at 720 (majority
opinion)).
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Although this part of Clifton Terrace is entirely dicta, it does provide a useful
theory for distinguishing between those services and privileges that are covered
by § 3604(b) in "sales" situation and those that are not. The former would
include-in addition to those offered by housing providers that are "attendant"
to the sale-those provided by others who "control the provision of housing
services and facilities" because only they can generate such services and
facilities.365
On the other hand, § 3604(b) would not extend to every type of
discrimination that could conceivably impact on post-acquisition owners' use or
enjoyment of their homes. Although one post-Halprin opinion has suggested
such a position by arguing that "it is difficult to imagine a privilege that flows
more naturally from the purchase or rental of a dwelling than the privilege of
residing therein, 366 the suggestion implicit in this statement seems too broad, at
least in "sale" situations. In these situations-unlike rentals-§ 3604(b)'s
"privileges" should be tied to some ownership-based right and thus would not
extend to every conceivable post-acquisition type of discrimination that might
have a negative impact on the enjoyment of one's home.
While such an interpretation of post-sale "services" and "privileges" would
thus be somewhat limited, the reach of § 3604(b) would be far from trivial.
Among other things, it would extend the FHA to ownership-based services and
privileges due to residents in condominiums and other similar community-owned
housing, which is becoming an increasingly important part of the American
housing market.3 67 It would also reinforce the view of those courts that have
opined that § 3604(b) guarantees nondiscrimination in police and fire protection
and garbage collection, as least to the extent that such services are provided to
all local homeowners based on their ownership of property in the area.3 68 How
it would apply in other municipal services cases, like Cox, is explored in the next
section.
365. See id. at 720 (majority opinion).
366. United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004). This case is further
described supra note 321. This comment was made after the court in Koch noted that the Halprin
opinion, itself, had observed that "'as a purely semantic matter,"' § 3604(b)'s "'privileges of sale
or rental' might conceivably be thought to include the privilege of inhabiting the premises." Id. at
976 (quoting Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329
(7th Cir. 2004)).
367. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT xiii (2005) (describing the tremendous growth since the 1960s in various
types of community-based homeownership and noting that "[b]y 2004, 18 percent-about 52
million Americans-lived in housing within a homeowners association, a condominium, or a
cooperative" and "since 1970 about one-third of all new housing units in the United States have
been built within a private community association").
368. See municipal services cases cited supra note 234.
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B. Application to Cox and Other Modem Municipal Services Cases
Cox, itself, is tricky. For one thing, the Fifth Circuit's opinion-being based
on the perceived inapplicability of § 3604(b) to post-acquisition
cases-sidestepped the key issue of which post-sale situations might be covered
by "assuming that the enforcement of zoning laws alleged here is a 'service"'
under § 3604(b).369 Cox also seemed to accept those decisions holding that
"general police and fire protection are within the scope of § 3604(b)" on the
ground that such protection might "conceivably" be connected "to the 'sale or
rental of a dwelling."
370
Still, the Cox opinion was clearly troubled by the implications of giving too
broad a reading to "services" in § 3604(b), fearing that "unmooring the 'services'
language from the 'sale or rental' language pushe[d] the FHA into a general anti-
discrimination pose, creating rights for any discriminatory act which impacts
property values-say, for generally inadequate police protection in a certain
area."' 37' Of course, such a right already exists by way of an equal protection
claim under § 1983, as the Cox case itself shows.372 Judge Higginbotham's
opinion observed, however, that the FHA, unlike § 1983, "does not require a
governmental policy or custom, and does not require proof of both discriminatory
impact and intent.
' '1
71
This meant, according to Cox, that the FHA was intended to operate only "in
the housing field and remains a housing statute. '374 Because the FHA "targets
only housing," its "services" provision is limited to those services that are
connected to housing sales or rentals, leading the Fifth Circuit to conclude that
the Cox plaintiffs' complaint that "the value or 'habitability' of their houses has
decreased" as a result of the defendants' alleged discrimination was not covered
369. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005). The Cox opinion, after noting
language in Southend, Clifton Terrace, and other appellate decisions offering conflicting views on
this matter, ultimately chose "not [to] decide this issue." Id. at 745 n.34.
370. Id. at 745-46 n.36 (citing Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. St. Clair
County, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984)).
371. Id. at 746.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 59 and 103-04. Part II.A.1 describes municipal
services claims based on § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.
373. Cox, 430 F.3d at 746. The requirement that a § 1983 action against a local government
be based on the defendant's "policy or custom" was established in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
In Cox, Judge Higginbotham also held that the plaintiffs' § 1981 claim, like their § 1983 claim,
required such a showing of "governmental policy or custom." See Cox, 430 F.3d at 746, 748. This
view is supported by Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, where the Supreme Court held that
a plaintiff asserting a § 1981 claim for damages against a governmental entity must show that the
violation of his § 1981 rights "was caused by a custom or policy within the meaning of Monell and
subsequent cases." 491 U.S. 701, 735-36 (1989).
374. Cox, 430 F.3d at 746.
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by § 3604(b).3 75 Post-acquisition owners or tenants can only invoke § 3604(b),
according to Cox, if they allege that the defendant's discrimination amounts to
"actual or constructive eviction" from their homes.376
This part of the Cox opinion is open to a variety of criticisms. For one thing,
it is not at all clear that an FHA-based claim of discriminatory municipal services
would not be subject to the same "policy or custom" requirement as one brought
under § 1983. Although the FHA does not explicitly include such a requirement,
neither does § 1983; the requirement derives, in the latter case, from judicial
interpretation of Congress's intent with respect to § 1983.377 In similar situations,
courts have seen fit to interpret the FHA in line with § 1983 precedents-for
example, in extending § 1983 immunities to individual officials sued for money
damages under the FHA378-perhaps because both statutes are considered to have
been enacted against the background of, and thereby to have incorporated,
traditional tort-law concepts.379
375. Id.
376. Id. Here, the Cox opinion cited a Fifth Circuit decision, Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d
1198 (5th Cir. 1982), which Cox described as upholding a § 3604(b) claim by a tenant who was
forced to vacate his apartment for entertaining black guests in violation of the landlord's "whites-
only" policy. Cox, 430 F.3d at 746. According to Cox, "[t]his was akin to constructive conviction
[sic] and was a clear discriminatory condition of 'a sale or rental of a dwelling."' Id. at 747.
Cox's reading of Woods-Drake is far too narrow. If actual or constructive eviction were all
that was involved in Woods-Drake, the plaintiff there could have relied on § 3604(a)'s "otherwise
make unavailable" provision, as both Cox and Halprin had already recognized. See Cox, 430 F.3d
at 742 & n.20 (quoted supra text accompanying note 96); Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes
of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoted supra text accompanying note
67). The § 3604(b) claim in Woods-Drake was based on the landlord's mere threat of eviction for
the plaintiff's having entertained black guests. 667 F.2d at 1200. In this situation (i.e., threats and
harassment that fall short of actual or constructive eviction), the availability of § 3604(b) apart from
§ 3604(a) is crucial and has regularly been relied on by courts, including the Fifth Circuit in Woods-
Drake. See id. at 1201; United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1024 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding
that discriminatory eviction violates § 3604 (a), while discriminatory attempted eviction violates §
3604(b)); other cases cited at SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 14:3 n.30. Thus, Woods-Drake and these
other cases stand for the proposition that § 3604(b) may be invoked in post-acquisition situations
to complain of discrimination that interferes with a tenant's "privileges of. . . rental," even when
this discrimination does not result in the plaintiff's actual or constructive eviction.
377. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
378. See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 12B:5 n.19.
379. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003) (interpreting the FHA); Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1975) (interpreting § 1983). But see People Helpers, Inc. v.
City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733-34 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that, unlike under § 1983,
a city may be held liable based on "respondeat superior" principles for its employees' FHA
violations).
As People Helpers indicates, Judge Higginbotham may be right that FHA claims against local
governments do not include a "policy or custom" requirement. In § 1983 cases, this requirement
was adopted by the Supreme Court as a way of avoiding the imposition of "respondeat superior"
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Cox's other reason for not allowing the FHA to be used to remedy
discriminatory municipal services-that an FHA claim, unlike one under the
Equal Protection Clause, could be based on discriminatory impact as well as
discriminatory intent ° -is also not very persuasive. While the FHA does cover
impact-based claims,381 the claim in Cox was based on discriminatory intent,382
and this has been true for virtually all other modem claims of discriminatory
municipal services. 383  While an impact-based claim is certainly
conceivable-such a claim was made in the early Hawkins case discussed in Part
ll.A.1 384-intent-based discrimination has been the basis for all modem
municipal services claims brought under the FHA.
Furthermore, the intent and "custom or policy" requirements are related, at
least as a practical matter. It will be recalled that in Cox, the trial court ruled
against the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim because they failed to prove an official
"policy or custom" and ruled against their § 1981 claim because they proved only
the City's "gross negligence" rather than its "intent to discriminate against them
on the basis of race., 385 The Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's determination
that the City's actions "amounted to 'negligence,' not a custom" and thus
affirmed its judgment on both the § 1981 and § 1983 claims as "sound in law and
fact. 386  On the other hand, if municipal officials were found to have
intentionally discriminated against a black neighborhood in the provision of
services, it seems likely that such action would usually be found also to reflect
the municipality's "policy or custom." As Judge Higginbotham recognized in
Cox, the concept of a municipality's "policy or custom" covers more than its
liability on municipal defendants for the federal-law violations of their employees. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 690-95. In contrast, the Court has endorsed such vicarious liability under the FHA, at least
for private defendants. See Meyer, 537 U.S. at 285-86. However, vicarious liability was also
thought proper in cases brought under the 1866 Civil Rights Act until the Court refused to extend
this understanding to § 1981 actions against municipalities, determining that § 1983 principles
should govern such actions. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731-36 (1989)
(noting that the Court had previously upheld damage claims based on vicarious liability "[i]n the
context of the application of § 1981 and § 1982 to private actors," but that this did not preclude
limiting such claims against municipal defendants to "custom or policy" situations). In short, until
the possibility of a Jett-type interpretation of the FHA has been authoritatively ruled out, Judge
Higginbotham's assumption in Cox that FHA claims against municipalities may succeed without
a § 1983-like showing of "policy or custom," Cox, 430 F.3d at 746, is not justified.
380. Cox, 430 F.3d at 746.
381. See cases cited in ScHwEMM, supra note 13, § 10:4 nn. 18-34, 41-42.
382. See Cox, 430 F.3d at 736-38.
383. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 124, 151, and 234.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21; see also infra notes 408-11 and
accompanying text.
385. Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL 2108253, at *16 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), affd, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005); see also supra text accompanying note
60.
386. Cox, 430 F.3d at 749.
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written policies, ordinances, and regulations;37 it extends as well to a "particular
course of action [that] is properly made by that government's authorized
decisionmakers. '388 Thus, if the municipal officials responsible for providing a
particular service (e.g., garbage collection) do so by intentionally discriminating
against a minority neighborhood, their actions may well establish a "custom or
policy" sufficient to justify municipal liability under § 1983.389 Of course, not
every incident involving a municipal employee's intentional discrimination
would satisfy the "custom or policy" requirement, 39° but those involving an on-
going pattern or practice of discriminatory municipal services generally would.39'
387. Id.
388. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,481 (1986); see also Cox, 430 F.3d at 748
(noting that "official policy" includes "a persistent, widespread practice of officials or employees
... [that] is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents the
municipality's policy").
389. See, e.g., Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (noting in § 1983 case that
"'policy' generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various
alternatives"); see also Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 ("[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches
where•., a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives
by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter
in question.") (plurality opinion).
390. Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Cox described a scenario in which intentional
discrimination might not reflect a municipality's "policy or custom," i.e., where those who are
engaged in the intentional discrimination are not municipal policymakers and the policymakers did
not have "actual or constructive knowledge of this practice.., at the time it occurred." Cox, 430
F.3d at 749 (quoting Cox, 2004 WL 2108253, at *10). Thus, for example, if municipal employees,
because of racial animus, refused to pick up garbage in black neighborhoods while providing better
service in white neighborhoods, but this practice was not known to city policymakers, no "policy
or custom"-and thus no governmental liability under § 1983-would be established. While this
scenario is theoretically possible, see, e.g., East-Miller v. Lake County Highway Dep't, 421 F.3d
558 (7th Cir. 2005) (dealing with minority homeowner's claim under the FHA's § 3617 that county
highway crews had damaged her mailbox while plowing snow based on racial animus), such an
example seems unlikely to produce the kind of municipal services litigation discussed in this
Article, simply because the residents of the disfavored minority neighborhood, as they did in Cox,
would generally seek relief informally by complaining to the relevant municipal policymakers
before filing their lawsuit.
391. In addition to Cox, a number of other § 1983-based claims of discriminatory municipal
services have noted that the municipality's liability requires a showing of "policy or custom." See,
e.g., Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
9,2004); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *1-2 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 14, 2002); Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (N.D. I11. 1993). Few,
if any, of these cases, however, have held that the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim failed where plaintiffs
were able to allege or prove intentional race discrimination. See, e.g., Miller, 2002 WL 230834,
at *2; cf. New W., L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that, for
purposes of satisfying Monell's "policy or custom" requirement, "there can be no doubt that § 1983
is available" here based on the fact that the defendant-municipality's "filing condemnation and
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Furthermore, in such cases, even were the municipality itself able to escape
liability because no "custom or policy" is shown, its responsible officials could
still be held liable under § 1983 for injunctive relief and perhaps money
damages,392 which, as shown by Hawkins and other early discriminatory
municipal services claims based on § 1983, might provide a sufficient remedy in
such cases.3 93
The point is that, in the vast majority of FHA-based municipal services
claims (i.e., those alleging intentional discrimination), relief would also be
available under § 1983 and the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Thus, Judge
Higginbotham's fear in Cox of the dire consequences of applying the FHA to
municipal services cases seems exaggerated. Indeed, the very way that Cox
expressed this fear-that the FHA could become "a general anti-discrimination
[law] . . .- say, for generally inadequate police protection in a certain
area"39 4-misses the point of what the Cox plaintiffs were complaining about.
Their claim was not based on "inadequate" municipal services in the plaintiffs'
neighborhood, but on the fact that such services were being provided in a
discriminatory way vis-a-vis the provision of those services in comparable white
neighborhoods.395 If, for example, a municipality could not afford to provide
adequate police protection in all neighborhoods-or even just in all poor
neighborhoods-but its inadequate protection was provided without regard to the
racial make-up of these areas, then neither § 3604(b) nor any other civil rights
statute would be violated. All that the Cox plaintiffs were advocating was that
§ 3604(b) be interpreted to reach as far as § 1983 and the 1866 Act had for
decades.396
Another reason to discount Cox's fear that the FHA might be used as a
general remedy for all sorts of discriminatory municipal services is that, as the
applicable HUD regulation provides, § 3604(b) only covers "services" and
nuisance suits is action by the City itself, as are statements made... by the Mayor").
392. As for injunctive relief, see, e.g., Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S.
66, 71 n.10 (1989) (noting, in case holding that states may not be sued under § 1983, that state
officials may still be sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief). As for money damage
awards against officials sued in their individual capacities, see, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Independent
School District, 491 U.S. 701, 707-08 (1989) (discussing plaintiff's § 1981 and § 1983 claims
against defendant Todd); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-22 (1975) (holding that § 1983
compensatory awards may be assessed against school board members and other officials with
"qualified immunity" unless their deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights was done in good
faith).
393. See cases cited supra notes 109 and 124, all of which were discriminatory municipal
services cases decided in the plaintiffs' favor and brought solely against the responsible individual
officials because, at the time, the Supreme Court had yet to permit § 1983 claims against a
municipality itself.
394. Cox, 430 F.3d at 746 (emphasis added).
395. Id. at 747.
396. See, as to § 1983, supra note 124 and accompanying text and, as to the 1866 Act, supra
note 146, note 151 and accompanying text, and note 171.
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"privileges" that are "associated with a dwelling. 397 Thus, a "services" claim in
post-acquisition situations should be recognized for, but limited to, those services
that are literally to be performed at a homeowner's residence, such as
discriminatory garbage collection and fire protection. Such an interpretation of
§ 3604(b) would also cover discrimination in municipal-supplied water and
sewer service, as two recent cases in Ohio and Georgia alleged.3 9 Police
protection and road maintenance would probably also be covered, as these
services, while not always directed at specific houses, are often provided in the
vicinity of such houses.399 By contrast, all other types of municipal services (e.g.,
public schools), while no doubt having an effect on the value of local residents'
housing, would not be covered by § 3604(b), because they are not directed at
such housing and therefore would not be considered "associated with a
dwelling."
As for a "privileges of sale" claim under § 3604(b), these should be limited
to those rights that are considered "part and parcel" of the property rights
397. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2007)).
398. See Steele v. City of Port Wentworth, Civ. A. No. CV405-135, 2008 WL 717813 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 17, 2008); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
In the Zanesville case, scores of individuals and two organizations sued a city, county,
township, and certain officials, claiming that the defendants had "a policy, pattern, and practice of
denying public water service to the individual [p]laintiffs during the last fifty years because they
are African-American and/or because they reside in a predominantly African-American
neighborhood." Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463. These discriminatory actions were alleged to
violate the FHA's § 3604(a) and § 3604(b), the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Title VI, and § 1983, as well
as certain state laws. Id. at 492-93 n.2 1. The defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety
of grounds, including lack of standing, tardiness, inadequate evidence of discrimination, and
inappropriate claims for relief, but not, apparently, on the merits of whether the FHA outlawed their
alleged behavior. See id. at 483. The district court granted parts of this motion (including holding
moot the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief because water service had been extended to their
neighborhood by January 2004), but it denied other parts and in particular upheld the plaintiffs'
compensatory damage claims against the City and County defendants under all of the cited federal
laws. Id. at 483-501.
In the Port Wentworth case, residents of two black neighborhoods accused their city of an on-
going practice of intentional racial discrimination by providing them inferior water, sewer, and
other municipal services to those accorded comparable white neighborhoods. Port Wentworth,
2008 WL 717813, at *1-10. The complaint was filed in 2005 and cited discriminatory acts dating
back to the 1980s. Id. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs' claims were not timely and that the FHA did not cover this situation. See id. at *10. On
March 17, 2008, the district court granted this motion, dismissing plaintiffs' § 3604(b) claim on the
basis of Cox and rejecting their § 1982 and § 1983 (equal protection) claims in part on statute-of-
limitations grounds and in part because of insufficient proof of discrimination. Id. at * 11-20.
399. See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486,
499, 502-03 (D.N.J. 2003) (opining that § 3604(b) would cover governmental units that provide
"specific residential services" including those "responsible for door-to-door ministrations such as
.. police departments [and] fire departments").
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obtained in purchasing one's home. As discussed above in Part lIJ.C, these
would include use of the common areas in condominiums and other community-
owned types of dwellings,' and, to the extent a local government ties access to
other rights or services to property ownership (e.g., the use of recreational areas
or city dumps), discrimination here would also be outlawed by § 3604(b). If
ownership of a home includes the right to send one's children to local public
schools, then discriminatory denial of access to these schools would also be
actionable under § 3604(b). A right to nondiscriminatory access, however,
would not include a claim based on the inadequacy of local schools, any more
than it would under the Equal Protection Clause."°
In applying these principles to the plaintiffs' claims in Cox, the issue would
become the one assumed away by the Fifth Circuit: that is, whether the
defendant's enforcement of its zoning law was a "service" or "privilege" under
§ 3604(b). The answer would clearly be "yes" if the targets of such zoning
enforcement were the plaintiffs' own homes, as is demonstrated by recent cases
alleging discriminatory enforcement against Hispanics of land-use restrictions,
building codes, and other municipal laws. 402 However, the Cox plaintiffs, like
400. See supra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
401. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) (holding that
providing inferior schools based on the wealth of the neighborhood does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
402. See, e.g., 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673,678,
682-85 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (described supra notes 233-34); Hispanics United of DuPage County v.
Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (approving settlement in class action
by Hispanic residents who alleged that their village's program of acquiring and demolishing
housing in plaintiffs' neighborhoods had a disparate impact and was based on intentional
discrimination against Hispanics); Nick Miroff, Culpepper Officials Targeting Illegal Immigrants:
Enforcement of Zoning Rules on Hearing Limits Is Town Council's Final Step, WASH. POST, Sept.
21,2006, at T10 (reporting on alleged FHA violations resulting from City's actions directed against
non-U.S. citizens); Nick Miroff, Manassas Official Irked by Pace of Housing Inquiry: HUD Looks
at Crowding Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2006, at PW01, available at http:Hwww.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/04/AR2006100400069.html (reporting on
HUD investigation of alleged FHA violations by City's discriminatory enforcement of it "anti-
crowding" ordinances against Hispanic families); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Illinois City
Will Pay $200,000 in Damages and Fines to Settle Housing Discrimination Suit (May 20, 1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/May97/208cr.htm (describing settlement of FHA
case alleging that the City of Waukegan, Illinois, enacted a housing code to limit the number of
Hispanic family members living together); see also Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d
477,554 (M.D. Pa. 2007), appealpending (3d Cir. 2008) (enjoining as unconstitutional defendant-
City's ordinances barring local landlords from renting to non-U.S. citizens, which allegedly had a
disparate impact on Hispanics); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp.
2d 757,777 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (same); cf. New W., L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 717,720-22 (7th
Cir. 2007) (reversing dismissal of claim by apartment owner that City attempted to condemn its
property and otherwise harassed it in violation of the FHA and § 1982 because of the race of its
tenants); People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 722, 733 (E.D. Va. 1992)
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those in Southend and a number of other cases that have rejected § 3604(b)
claims by local residents,43 were complaining of the defendants' enforcement
actions directed at other properties. In such a case, a "services" claim under §
3604(b) would be unavailing. As for a "privileges" claim, neighboring
homeowners presumably have a right of access to complain to local zoning
enforcement officials, but their homeowner-status would generally not give them
the right to insist that these officials act in a particular way. In other words, a
"privilege of sale" claim could also have been rejected in Cox based on a correct
understanding of § 3604(b).
This analysis, then, suggests that the Fifth Circuit was justified in denying
relief under the FHA in Cox. This is not to belittle the injuries suffered by the
homeowner-plaintiffs there. Clearly, those injuries were serious; among other
things, as the Fifth Circuit recognized, the Cox plaintiffs alleged that "the value
or 'habitability' of their houses has decreased" as a result of the defendants'
alleged discrimination.4°4 This, however, merely gave the plaintiffs standing to
sue. It did not establish that their injuries were the result of an FHA violation.
As to this point, the Cox plaintiffs may well have been trying to stretch § 3604(b)
beyond its proper scope.
C. Why Does FHA Coverage Matter?
As the Cox litigation demonstrates, residents in minority neighborhoods who
complain of discriminatory municipal services may proceed under the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, § 1983 (to enforce an equal protection claim), and perhaps other
federal laws, regardless of whether they have a claim under the FHA. This raises
the question whether FHA coverage of this type of case is of any practical
significance. It may be, but most of the reasons deal with procedures and relief
rather than substance.
As for substance, Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Cox noted two
differences between an FHA-based claim and those based on other federal civil
rights laws: (1) the FHA includes an impact, as well as an intent, standard; and
(2) municipal liability may be established under the FHA without a showing of
governmental "policy or practice" as is required in § 1983 claims.405 Earlier, I
discounted the practical value of these differences, noting that discriminatory
municipal services cases tend to be intent-based claims and that § 1983 concepts
may be incorporated into FHA doctrine in such cases.'
As for the intent requirement, § 1982, an equal protection claim under §
(upholding § 3617 claim based on municipality's discriminatory investigation of plaintiffs' group
home for people with disabilities that was allegedly designed to shut down this home).
403. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (Southend); see also supra notes 237-39 and
accompanying text (other cases).
404. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005).
405. Id. at 746.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 377-93.
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1983, and a private claim under Title VI all do require such a showing, 47 which
means that, to the extent an impact-only claim of discriminatory municipal
services is made, the FHA would be uniquely valuable. Still, such a claim seems
unlikely to occur very often.4"8 It would require that the defendant-municipality's
inferior services to a black neighborhood result from a neutral policy that, albeit
having a disproportionate impact on minorities, is being applied in a
nondiscriminatory way. 09 Except for the defendants' assertion in Hawkins that
they needed to upgrade services in poorer neighborhoods on a delayed basis
because of fiscal constraints, 41 it is hard to imagine such a neutral policy and
therefore hard to imagine an impact-only claim of discriminatory municipal
services.
Apart from these issues, the arguments I have made for FHA coverage of
discriminatory municipal services have gone no farther than what would be
substantively outlawed by § 1982 and § 1983. 4" Therefore, the primary value of
FHA coverage would be in those cases where the FHA' s procedures or relief are
more favorable than § 1982's and § 1983's. One possible difference here is that
407. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (§ 1982); supra notes 122-23 and
accompanying text (equal protection claims under § 1983); supra note 155 and accompanying text
(Title VI).
408. See, e.g., Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (noting that
there is "no substantial difference between these [§ 1982 and § 1983] claims and the Fair Housing
Act claim[] .... except that plaintiffs who make claims under § 1982, and under § 1983 based on
equal protection, have been required to allege that some intentional discrimination took place.
Because the plaintiffs do allege that the County intentionally discriminated against them, the
complaint adequately states both claims.") (citation omitted); cf. Good Shepherd Manor Found. v.
City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that City's cut-off of water supply
to group home for disabled persons would violate the FHA if it were motivated by "discriminatory
intent," but that such a claim could not be based on discriminatory impact).
409. See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 10:6 nn.l-3 and accompanying text.
410. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162, 1168-69 (N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd,
461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
411. Even if FHA coverage only goes as far as § 1982 and § 1983, one advantage of such
coverage would be the availability of the FHA's § 3617, see 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000), which
outlaws, inter alia, retaliation against those who have exercised their § 3604 rights. Compare
SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 20:5 n.2 and accompanying text (describing § 3617 retaliation claims)
with CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 30 (2007) (granting certiorari to determine whether
retaliation claims may be brought under the 1866 Civil Rights Act).
The FHA's § 3617 also bans interference with current residents and others who have exercised
their § 3604 rights, see SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 20:1 nn.5-6 and accompanying text, but, given
the text's conclusion that § 3604 itself covers discriminatory municipal services claims by such
residents, the additional value of § 3617 in these cases-other than to protect against
retaliation-would seem to be marginal. See, e.g., Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138,
1144 (N.D. I11. 1993) (upholding black homeowners' § 3617 claim of discrimination in the
provision of police protection as a result of having held that such discrimination violates §
3604(b)).
[Vol. 41:717
COX, HALPRIN AND THE FHA
standing to sue is broader under the FHA, extending not only to the direct victims
of a defendant's discrimination (e.g., local homeowners in a discriminatory
municipal services case), but also to all others injured by such discrimination,
including fair housing organizations and other advocacy groups."a 2 Furthermore,
the FHA, unlike § 1982 and § 1983, authorizes both HUD and the Justice
Department to bring enforcement suits, 3 and both have been active in certain
types of discriminatory municipal services cases.414
Another clear difference between the FHA versus § 1982 and § 1983 is that
the former is subject to different statutes of limitations, with the FHA having a
one-year limitations period for administrative complaints and a two-year period
for private lawsuits,15 while § 1982 and § 1983, being silent on this matter, are
governed by the local state's most analogous limitations period.416 This
difference has proved important in some cases challenging discriminatory
government services.417 Furthermore, the "continuing violation theory" as a way
412. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456,476-77 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(noting, in a municipal services case, that the FHA claim was brought by organizational plaintiffs
as well as homeowner-plaintiffs, whereas only the latter brought the § 1982, § 1983, and Title VI
claims); Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Owners Ass'n, No. Civ. A. 96-2495RMU, 1997 WL
187720, at *2-5 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (upholding fair housing organization's standing to bring
FHA claim based on condominium association's toleration of race and sex harassment of
condominium resident, but denying such standing under § 1981 and § 1982); see also Jackson, 21
F.3d at 1539-40 (upholding "neighborhood standing" under the FHA, but declining to address such
standing under § 1982 and § 1983). See generally Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 109 (1979) (holding that FHA standing "extend[s] to the.., limits of Art. Ir'
and that anyone may sue who is "genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone's.., fights"
under the FHA).
413. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing HUD to file FHA administrative
complaints) and § 3614(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to file FHA "pattern or practice"
actions).
414. See, e.g., HUD and Justice cases cited supra note 402.
415. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (addressing administrative complaints) and §
3613(a)(1)(A) (addressing civil lawsuits).
416. See SCHwEMM, supra note 13, § 27:21 n.7 and accompanying text (regarding § 1982) and
§ 28:10, nn.14-16 and accompanying text (regarding § 1983).
417. See, e.g., Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187-88 (4th
Cir. 1999) (dismissing as "time-barred" § 1983 claim under Maryland's three-year limitations
period in a claim by black residents' challenging the siting of a new highway near their
neighborhood); Edwards v. Media Borough Council, 430 F. Supp. 2d 445,450-51 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(dismissing, in case alleging discriminatory municipal services, § 1983 claim as time barred, but
dealing with claim based on FHA's § 3604(b) on the merits); Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341
F. Supp. 2d 950, 956-58 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), subsequent decision, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir.
2004) (dismissing as time barred § 1982 and § 1983 claims based on Tennessee's one-year
limitations period, while upholding some FHA claims by black property owner who alleged that
municipal officials denied water service to plaintiff's planned home because of his race); cf. Franks
v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 188 n.1, 194-96 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding § 1982 and equal protection
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for plaintiffs to extend the limitations period-which may often be important in
cases involving discriminatory municipal services41 8 is well-established under
the FHA 419 but has a mixed record in such cases based on § 1982 and § 1983.42
Another statute-of-limitations advantage of the FHA is that FHA actions brought
by the Justice Department seeking injunctive relief are not subject to any time
limits.
421
Finally, while the same relief is generally available in FHA and § 1982 cases
(i.e., injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, and attorney's fees
awards),422 there may be two differences, both of which deal with limits on
damage awards that may be assessed against municipalities and their officials.
The problem derives from the fact that in § 1983-based cases against such
defendants, individual officials have been accorded qualified ("good faith")
423
immunity from damage awards, 424 and municipalities are not subject to punitive
damages.425 It is unclear whether either or both of these limits applies to § 1982
claims based on North Carolina's three-year limitations period in case where residents of black
town claimed County was siting undesirable landfill near them based on race and where plaintiffs'
FHA claim had been dismissed).
418. See, e.g., cases described supra notes 398, 417.
419. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,380-81 (1982). In the 1988 FHAA,
Congress endorsed the "continuing violation theory." See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i), §
3613(a)(1)(A); ScHwEMM, supra note 13, § 25:2 nn.22-23 and accompanying text.
420. Compare Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456,488-92 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(upholding, based on continuing violation theory, timeliness of claims based on § 1982 and § 1983
as well as those based on the FHA), with Middlebrook, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 956-58, 957 n.5
(dismissing as time barred § 1982 and § 1983 claims on the ground that no continuing violation
exists here for defendants' "passive inaction" in case brought by black property owner alleging that
municipal officials denied water service to plaintiffs planned home because of his race), subsequent
decision, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir. 2004).
421. See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 26:5 nn.6, 8.
422. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (FHA); SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 27:22-:24 (discussing §
1982). Punitive damages are not available against municipal defendants under § 1983. See infra
note 425 and accompanying text.
423. See, e.g., Kennedy, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (discussing qualified immunity as "'good
faith' immunity").
424. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-08, 813-19 (1982). Local legislators
have absolute immunity from § 1983 damage claims when acting in their legislative capacity. See
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1998). However, "qualified immunity represents the
norm," Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, and such "good faith" immunity would thus generally apply to
zoning officials and others likely to be sued in municipal services discrimination cases. See, e.g.,
Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mission
Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 954 P.2d 250, 260-61 (Wash. 1998).
425. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,259-71 (1981); see also Miller
v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *17 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14,2002)
(disallowing punitive damages in § 1983 claim alleging discriminatory services by municipality
based on City of Newport, but denying such damages under the FHA only after analyzing the
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or the FHA. One possibility, however, is that § 1982 would be interpreted with
similar damage limits to those of § 1983 because both statutes were passed
during the post-Civil War era,426 whereas the FHA, as a modem civil rights
statute, was not.427 Although one recent municipal services decision read the
FHA as subject to both of these limitations, 4 28 this view is not well established.429
If it is not followed, then the FHA could be of unique value in such cases,
particularly with respect to its potential authorization of punitive damage awards
against municipal defendants.
CONCLUSION
Four decades after passage of the federal Fair Housing Act, racially
segregated housing patterns remain the norm throughout the United States, a
specific facts alleged here).
Punitive damages are also not available under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-89 (2002).
426. See, e.g., Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 1982) (holding that municipalities' § 1983 immunity from punitive damages also applies to
claims under § 1981); cf Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (described supra note
379 para. 2). But see Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 191 (7th Cir. 1982)
(finding it "doubtful" that municipalities' immunity from § 1983 punitive damages also applies to
§ 1982 claims).
427. See, e.g., Miller, 2002 WL 230834, at *17 (described supra note 425). Punitive damages
are explicitly authorized in privately initiated enforcement actions under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c)(1). Nor does the FHA explicitly provide for immunity for individual public defendants,
although such immunity has been accorded to some public officials in FHA cases. See SCHWEMM,
supra note 13, § 12:5 n.19 and accompanying text.
428. See Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456,492 n.21,499-500 (S.D. Ohio
2007).
429. As to whether municipalities may be sued for punitive damages under the FHA, compare
Phillips, 685 F.2d at 191 (affirming FHA punitive award against defendant that was assumed to be
a municipality for purposes of claiming immunity from such an award), with N.J. Coal. of Rooming
& Boarding House Owners v. Mayor of Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217,225 (3d Cir. 1998) (expressing
doubt in FHA case that punitive damages "can be ... awarded against" municipalities) and
Developmental Servs. of Neb. v. City of Lincoln, 504 F. Supp. 2d 726, 738 n.20 (D. Neb. 2007)
(citing Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2001) for
the proposition that the FHA "does not authorize punitive damages against municipalit[ies]"); see
also Miller, 2002 WL 230834, at *17 (described supra note 425). Regardless of how this issue is
settled, it appears that civil penalties may be assessed against municipalities in a proper FHA case
brought by the government. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920,933 (6th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 363 (D.N.J. 1991), affd
without opinion, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992).
As to whether municipal officials sued for damages under the FHA enjoy § 1983-like
immunities, some courts have held that they do, but this issue has not yet been authoritatively
settled. See SclqwEMM, supra note 13, § 12B:5 nn.15-19 and accompanying text.
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result that would have dismayed the FHA's original proponents. One
consequence of this on-going segregation is that residents of minority
neighborhoods continue to be in a position to allege that they are receiving
inferior municipal services to those provided in comparable white communities.
This type of claim was well known when the FHA was in its infancy and the
primary bases for challenging such discrimination were thought to be the Equal
Protection Clause and § 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
The FHA soon emerged as an alternative basis for such challenges,
particularly as the courts gave this statute a generous construction. The 1988
Fair Housing Amendments Act added to this momentum by, inter alia, providing
the FHA with a much stronger set of enforcement mechanisms and directing
HUD to issue substantive regulations, one of which soon identified
discriminatory municipal services as being outlawed by the FHA.
In the meantime, however, the federal judiciary was becoming more hostile
to civil rights claims, as a series of ever more conservative Republican presidents
made good on their promises to appoint increasingly reactionary judges to the
federal bench. Ultimately, the retrenchment of the federal judiciary on civil
rights was reflected in two appellate decisions involving the FHA-by the
Seventh Circuit in Halprin in 2004430 and the Fifth Circuit in Cox in
20054 31-that narrowly construed the FHA's most important provision, § 3604,
as protecting only homeseekers rather than also current residents.432 In Halprin,
Judge Posner ruled that § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) did not extend to post-
acquisition discrimination, 433 and, agreeing with Halprin, Judge Higginbotham
in Cox held that neither of these provisions could be invoked by residents of a
black neighborhood to challenge inferior municipal services that negatively
affected the habitability of their homes.434
Focusing on the Cox issue of whether the FHA outlaws discriminatory
municipal services, this Article has closely examined the language and legislative
history of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) and has shown that Halprin and Cox were
wrong to interpret them not to apply in post-acquisition situations. In particular,
§ 3604(b)'s guarantee of nondiscrimination in housing-related "privileges" and
"services"--even if limited to those connected with the "sale or rental of a
dwelling"-should apply, as to "rentals," throughout a tenant's residency and,
as to "sales," to privileges and services that are tied to homeownership.
4 35
The latter would include fire and police protection, garbage collection, and
a number of other services provided by local governments to residents based on
their ownership of property in the area. This interpretation of § 3604(b),
however, would not include the precise claim made by the plaintiffs in Cox,
430. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir.
2004).
431. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005).
432. See Cox, 430 F.3d at 744-45; Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329-30.
433. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
434. Cox, 430 F.3d at 744-45.
435. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
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which was that the municipal defendant discriminatorily failed to adequately
enforce its zoning laws against another property owner.436
This Article's ultimate conclusion is that, while the result in Cox may be
defended, its analysis and that of Halprin are so flawed-and in particular have
so misconstrued § 3604(b) of the FHA-that they should be rejected by other
federal and state courts, even as they stand as an unfortunate impediment to FHA
enforcement in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits for the foreseeable future.437 For
these other courts, the analysis offered in this Article provides a sounder
approach to FHA-based claims alleging discriminatory municipal services and,
more generally, to § 3604(b) claims in post-acquisition situations.
A final comment is in order. While the misguided analysis in Halprin and
Cox should be rejected in favor of a broader interpretation of the F-A, the
ultimate problem in Cox-that of inferior services being provided to
predominantly minority neighborhoods-will, in my judgment, be with us long
after the Halprin-Cox analysis has been laid to rest. The problem of
discriminatory municipal services is, after all, a function of the fact that ghetto-
like, one-race neighborhoods continue to exist in the face of the clear desire of
the FHA's proponents to replace them with truly integrated housing patterns.
Until this 1968 dream becomes a twenty-first century reality, residents of heavily
minority neighborhoods will suffer in countless ways,438 not the least of which
is that municipal officials will continue to be tempted to under-serve these areas
regardless of the threat of an FHA lawsuit.439 That threat, after all, has been
available under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1982 for decades, and yet
lawsuits alleging discriminatory municipal services continue to be filed on a
regular basis throughout the Nation. The only long-term hope for ending such
discrimination is to end the prerequisite for such claims. This means, at long last,
to achieve the integrated housing patterns envisioned by the FHA.
436. Cox, 430 F.3d at 740.
437. See, e.g., Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 235 F. App'x 227,
227-28 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of FHA claims by condominium owner "because they
go to the habitability of her condominium and not the availability of housing" (citing Cox, 430 F.3d
at 741; Halprin, 388 F.3d 327)).
438.
Residential segregation is not benign. It does not mean only that blacks and
Hispanics, Asians and whites live in different neighborhoods with little contact between
them. It means that whatever their personal circumstances, black and Hispanic families
on average live at a disadvantage and raise their children in communities with fewer
resources. It cannot be a surprise, then, that it is harder for them to reach their potential.
JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS AND HISPANICS
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 20 (2002), available at
http://www.s4.brown.edulcen2OO0/SepUneq/SUReportSeparate-and-_Unequal.pdf.
439. "[Americans] seem to understand, if not accept, that the opportunities and amenities
available in a neighborhood, as well as the responsiveness of local government to its needs, are
often closely calibrated to its racial and economic makeup." CASiN, supra note 7, at xvi.
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